School Punishment Kills Student

It has been reported that a girl in Delhi died after being punished in the municipal school she attended. Her name was Shanno, and she was eleven years old. Apparently, her teacher made her sit in a position imitating a chicken for two hours in the sun and piled bricks on her back. The girl is reported to have died from a lack of oxygen although the details are not clear.

Much could be said about the teacher’s lack of all good sense and humanity but words would probably do a poor job of describing it. To treat a child in such a manner especially considering that temperatures in Delhi are well over 40 degrees centigrade would require extraordinary cruelty.

The media, in its coverage, seems to have focussed on the dearth of laws to protect a child in such a situation and has spoken of the Delhi High Court and the NCPCC taking a stand against corporal
punishment in schools.

It isn’t entirely clear why that should be especially relevant in a case such as this. The Indian Penal Code doesn’t have any shortage of provisions to deal with harming other persons be they children or
adults: causing hurt, causing grievous hurt, assault, murder and culpable homicide, among others.

And while it is certainly not a bad idea to have some sui generis legislation in place banning the corporal punishment of children both within and outside schools, it is entirely ridiculous to imply that
the absence of such legislation in any way bars awarding punishment to those guilty of assaulting a child.

Even leaving criminal law aside, erring teachers and institutions could always be sued under tort law. The principle of vicarious liability, among other things, would ensure that schools which had such teachers could also be pursued through legal channels.

True, children are often assaulted by school teachers. True, there exists no law which specifically deals with banning corporal punishment. It does not, however, automatically follow that there are no remedies available to children and their parents when teachers act in such an unconscionable manner and assault their students.

The Recovery of Loans

The accepted practice is for people to approach civil courts for relief in respect of civil offences and for criminal offences to be tried in criminal courts. In addition to this, no one can be sent to gaol because of having committed a civil offence. Neither can people be jailed merely because they are unable to repay debts. This has been accepted not only at the national level but has in fact been enshrined in international covenants which have been signed by a vast majority of the world’s countries.

However, there are times when some financial entities and assorted money lenders have been accused of trying to turn civil wrongs into criminal offences by abusing the legal process. In all probability
this is done to pressurize borrowers to repay money.

The method which is apparently usually used is to accuse the borrower of having cheated and having committed a criminal breach of trust. Both cheating and criminal breaches of trust are offences under the Indian Penal Code, the former in the infamous Section 420 and the latter in Section 406.

High Courts are of course empowered to stop this from happening and frequently do. In the case of Alpic Finance v. Sadasivam, the Supreme Court upheld the order of the High Court quashing a criminal complaint against a borrower under such circumstances.

Also, although lawyers often use the ‘cheating and criminal breach of trust’ template, it is unclear exactly how it is possible to be guilty of both offences at the same time considering that, as the Madras High Court held in the 1936 case of R v. McIver, the two are incompatible. One rests on an intention to deceive while the other rests on a foundation of trust, so to speak.

Even if it is somehow possible to commit the offences simultaneously, the fact remains that civil wrongs are not to be disguised as criminal offences, and ordinarily, it should be possible to prevent this from happening by approaching the High Court.

Absurd Reason for Rape Acquittal

If there ever was a crazy reason to let a man get away with rape, it’d have to be this reasoning behind the judgement of the Orissa High Court: “Law is well settled that it is not possible for a single man to commit sexual intercourse with a healthy adult female in full possession of her senses against her will.”

 At first glance, the reasoning is just about as ‘sound’ as it was in the “Jeans are difficult for another to remove. Therefore, a woman who was wearing them could not have been raped.” case and as repugnant as Judge Archie Simonson’s “Women are sex objects whether or not they like it.” logic.

 

In the case in which the High Court came up with this extraordinary pronouncement, a healthy tribal woman whom the High Court deemed capable of resisting rape was raped and there was only one witness to the crime. The High Court concluded that the perpetrator had either been falsely accused or that the sex was consensual. The court based its conclusions upon the reasoning that there was no evidence of any resistance on the part of the woman.

 

Luckily, the Supreme Court did not agree with the it. On December 16, 2008 Justices Arijit Pasayat and Mukundam Sharma quashed the acquittal order passed by the High Court and proclaimed:

 

“The conclusions are not only confusing but border on absurdity.” The apex court also professed itself to be baffled as to why the HC said that the law says that it is impossible for a single man to rape a healthy woman who was in possession of her senses since, as it pointed out, “there is not even a single decision which says so.”

 

The Supreme Court also reprimanded the High Court judge for failing to adhere to judicial discipline by disclosing the name of the rape victim.

 

(The relevant case is State of Orissa v Sukru Gouda.)

Amending the Law on Adultery

Adultery was made a crime under India’s current legal system during the time of the Raj itself. Based on the idea that a wife belonged to her husband in the most literal sense of the word, the Indian Penal Code allowed husbands to choose to have criminal proceedings initiated against those men with whom their wives committed adultery since those men had laid claim over the ‘property’ which did not belong to them.

After independence, the law was challenged in a series of decisions, but the Courts upheld its validity and said that not only was the law constitutional but that it was also fair not to proceed against an adulterous wife through the Indian Penal Code. The rationale behind this changed though; wives were seen as being innocent and as requiring protection. Also, the courts ruled that the provisions of criminal law were not intended to be used by one spouse against the other.

Given current circumstances, and considering that Victorian England along with its moral code no longer exists, one would imagine that adultery should not be a crime. However, it has been widely reported that contrary to attempting to decriminalise adultery, the Government has been trying to garner opinions to see if and how the law can beamended to make wives punishable for the offence of adultery as well.

A number of activists have opposed this move for reasons ranging from their not believing that women should be made accountable considering that they are hardly in powerful socio-economic positions to not believing that adultery should be a crime at all.

It isn’t entirely clear why the Government is concentrating on making the criminal provisions dealing with adultery gender-neutral instead of focussing on making adultery merely a civil wrong. Civil wrongs do not leave people in gaol, crimes can.

*IPC section 497: Whoever has consensual sexual intercourse with a wife of another man, without the consent or connivance of that man, is guilty of adultery.”

Nasty Comments on Your Blog

What do you do if someone leaves distasteful comments on your blog?

The law regarding comments is actually a bit dicey: if a blog owner’s Terms of Service clearly say that they allow unmoderated comments, that they bear no responsibility, and if they remove nasty comments once they’re brought to their notice, they generally won’t be held liable for nasty comments made by other people. The picture changes, however, if the comments on a blog are moderated: if a blog’s owner chooses to take on the responsibility of not allowing nasty comments, then they will be liable if any appear. The result is that absurdly enough, the less care you take, the less liable you are. This is, however, drawn from case law in non-Indian jurisdictions; the Indian position is unclear.

The Law Applicable

In the case of a blog, there are two different agreements.

One between the owner of the blog and and WordPress / Blogger / Blogware / whichever service used i.e. the fascinating Terms of Service which hardly anyone ever reads.

In the case of blogs hosted by WordPress / Automattic, that agreement is governed by US law. As far as the choice of forum is concerned, there seem to be three aspects, briefly: (a) that disputes regarding the access to / use of the site are to be settled at a San Francisco court, (b) that disputes regarding the terms of the ToS themselves are to be settled by specified arbitrators and (c) that injunctions can be obtained and IP claims settled at any competent court.

The Automattic ToS does not speak of which law applies to the IP claims and one can only suspect that the issue is arguable since according to the agreement, all IP remains with authors and is not assigned to Automattic. So, the content of a blog may not automatically be treated as a part of the site to which the ToS applies.

However, the ToS is a boilerplate contract so presumably it could be challenged in an Indian Court which probably wouldn’t be too useful since in the absence of unconscionability etc., Indian Courts are not particularly enthusiastic about interfering with contractual choices of law or fora.

The second agreement would be between the owner of the blog and their visitors.

In such a case, the owner of the blog could be the one to impose a standard contract saying that the use of their blog is governed by so-and-so law. Or that all disputes in relation to it are to be settled at such-and-such place.

If the owner of a blog does not have such an agreement, if a case was to be filed, it could be done wherever the cause of action was to arise. Obviously. The country where it was filed would generally apply its own law. Any court could choose to override the ToS of the owner of the blog. The only thing the ToS would do is give them a much firmer ground to stand on while arguing their case.

The bottomline is that there’s nothing to stop anyone from filing anything anywhere. The best the owner of a blog can hope for if that happens is that the case gets thrown out in a hurry.

Consider a case where a third party were to sue for a nasty comment about him. Continuing with the same example, WordPress, if it could be sued, would probably have to be sued in the US because that’s what its ToS mandates. The owner of the blog could theoretically be sued in India. Or the blog service provider and the owner of the blog could be sued wherever the comments were viewed and the damage was done (although an Australian Court refused to allow a plaintiff to sue in such circumstances in Australia a while ago because of a ToS agreement which said that all disputes must exclusively be settled in the US).

In India, case law is still emerging and statutory law is woefully inadequate at the moment.

Defamation

Defamation in India is both a criminal offence and a civil wrong, and there is nothing to stop someone from suing the owner of a blog. And if he / she showed that the actions / inaction of the owner contributed to the defamation, presumably, that person would probably be awarded damages.

As far as defamation as a criminal offence is concerned, the position is somewhat different and only the person who actually makes a defamatory statement can be prosecuted. The Penal Code which was drafted in 1860 obviously has not taken the creation of the Internet into account.

The IT Act

Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 which deals with the liability of ‘webmasters’ says:

Network service providers not to be liable in certain cases
For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that no person providing any service as a network service provider shall be liable under this Act, rules or regulations made thereunder for any third party information or data made available by him if he proves that the offence or contravention was committed without his knowledge or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence or contravention.

A ‘network service provider’ means an intermediary, and under Section 2(w) of the Act, an ‘intermediary’ with respect to any particular electronic message means any person who on behalf of another person receives, stores or transmits that message or provides any service with respect to that message.’Third party information’ means any information dealt with by a network service provider in his capacity as an intermediary.

Suicide at a Police Station

A mother of two young girls named Sarita, 25, alleged that two Haryana policemen — Head Constable Balraj Singh and Constable Sheelak Ram — had raped her in a police station in April 2008. The two policemen belong to a special unit which was set up to investigate special crimes and major murders.

In the FIR she had filed, she said that they had implicated her husband in a false theft case and asked her for sexual favours to ensure his release. When she refused to comply with their demands, they raped her.

After making numerous attempts to at least get the wheels of justice to begin to move, and failing to do so, she committed suicide on June 9, 2008 in broad daylight in the presence of several people at Police Headquarters. In a suicide note, she also said that the police officers had been issuing threats to have the case withdrawn.

Not too surprisingly, the Government sprung into action after this happened (although her body was left in public view loosely covered by a white cloth for hours before it was taken for a postmortem).

Officers were transferred, compensation was promised, her husband was assured a government job and an NGO, World Human Rights Protection Council President and advocate Ranjan Lakhanpal filed a PIL asking for a CBI probe into the matter.

The Punjab and Haryana High Court also took suo moto cognisance of the case and a Bench comprising Justices Permod Kohli and Rakesh Kumar Garg observed that ‘when the protectors of the law become perpetrators of crime, the life of the common man becomes miserable’.

This is not the first time the police have come under fire for behaviour such as this. The most well-known case of rape in a police station was that of a tribal teenage girl named Mathura in the 1970s. The trial court judge in that case called her a shocking liar although the High Court convicted the policemen — Tukaram and another — involved. The Supreme Court, however, then acquitted the policemen. The case aroused widespread outrage and the laws in rape were subsequently amended mainly as a result of what many considered to be an absurd decision in the Mathura case.

Now, under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, which provides for an enhanced punishment in certain cases, whoever being a police officer commits rape:
1. within the limits of the police station to which he is appointed or
2. in the premises of any station house whether or not situated in the police station to which he is appointed or
3. on a woman in his custody or in the custody of a police officer subordinate to him
is liable to be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years but which may be for life and shall also be liable to fine although the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment of either description for a term of less than ten years.

The MMS Scandal and the Law

In a case involving an MMS showing two schoolchildren engaged in an intimate act being uploaded on to a website, Justice Muralidhar of the Delhi High Court pointed out that ‘since the IPC does not recognise the concept of an automatic criminal liability attaching to the Director where the company is an accused not even a prima facie case for offence under sections 292 and 294 is made out [against Mr Bajaj, the MD of the company at the time].’

Justice S Muralidhar went on to drop charges under the Indian Penal Code against Avinash Bajaj, the former Manging Director of Bazee.com (now Ebay India Pvt. Ltd.). Mr Bajaj had been charged with offences under IPC as well as with offences under the Information and Technology Act.

Pornography is easily available in India (just as it is in the rest of the world). In fact, any discussion about the availability of pornography is ludicrous in the Age of Online Porn. And, whether or not one wants to admit it, it is closely linked to prostitution and to trafficking: ‘today, the hunt for cheap, easy prey has been made significantly easier because the prowlers know exactly where to click’.

There are provisions in the Penal Code, the Information Technology Act and the Indecent Representation of Women Act to deal with porn and other forms of indecent representation though.

The Indian Penal Code says:

    Any book, pamphlet, paper, writing, drawing, painting, representation, figure or any other object, is deemed to be obscene under Section 292 of the Indian Penal Code ‘if it is lascivious or appeals to the prurient interest or if its effect (or where it comprises two or more distinct items, the effect of any one of its items) is, if taken as a whole, such as to tend to deprave and corrupt persons, who are likely, having regard to all relevant circumstances, to read, see or hear the matter contained or embodied in it.

    Under Section 292 (2), whoever

  1. sells, lets to hire, distributes, publicly exhibits or in any manner, puts into circulation or for purposes of sale, hire, distribution, public exhibition or circulation, makes, produces or has in his possession any obscene book, pamphlet, paper, drawing, painting, representation or figure or any other obscene object whatsoever or
  2. imports, exports or conveys any obscene object for any of the purposes aforesaid, or knowing or having reason to believe that such object will be sold, let to hire, distributed or publicly exhibited or in any manner put into circulation or
  3. takes part in or receives profits from any business in the course of which he knows or has reason to believe that any such obscene objects are, for any of the purposes aforesaid, made, produced, purchased, kept, imported, exported, conveyed, publicly exhibited or in any manner put into circulation or
  4. advertises or makes known by any means whatsoever that any person is engaged or is ready to engage in any act which is an offence under this Section or that any such obscene object can be procured from or through any person or
  5. offers or attempts to do any act which is an offence under this Section, shall be punished on first conviction with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, and with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees, and, in the event of a second or subsequent conviction, with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to five years, and also with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees.

    This Section does not extend to:

  • any book, pamphlet, paper, writing, drawing, painting, representation or figure
    1. the publication of which is proved to be justified as being for the public good on the ground that such book, pamphlet, paper, writing, drawing, painting, representation or figure is in the interest of science, literature, art or learning or other objects of general concern or
    2. which is kept or used bonafide for religious purposes
  • any representation sculptured, engraved, painted or otherwise represented on or in
    1. any ancient monument within the meaning of the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains Act, 1958 or
    2. any temple or on any car used for the conveyance of idols or kept or used for any religious purpose.

    And under Section 293 which deals with the punishment of an act listed in Section 292, ‘whoever sells, lets to hire, distributes, exhibits or circulates to any person under the age of twenty years any such obscene object as is referred to in the last preceding Section or offers or attempts so to do, shall be punished on first conviction with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, and with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees, and, in the event of a second or subsequent conviction, with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and also with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees.’

The Indian Penal Code does not define obscenity itself. In Ranjit D Udeshi v/s State of Maharashtra, 1965,2 the Supreme Court, however, accepted the test formulated over a century ago in R v/s Hicklin, the case under which a bookseller was prosecuted for keeping and selling the supposedly obscene Lady Chatterley’s Lover. Despite the furore which the book created when it was first published, by itself, it simply cannot be considered obscene by contemporary standard and as such, the test in R v/s Hicklin, which quite simply fails either to recognise or to make provision for this change in the perception of obscenity, should not have been accepted.

Parliament passed the Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act in 1986. It extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir and is meant to ‘prohibit indecent representation of women through advertisements or in publications, writings, paintings, figures’.

‘Indecent representation of women’ means the depiction in any manner of the figure of a woman; her form or body or any part thereof in such way as to have the effect of being indecent or derogatory to or denigrating women or as is likely to deprave, corrupt or injure public morality or morals. 3

Further, there is a provision in the Information Technology Act, 2000 which deals with the publishing of information which is obscene in electronic form.

The Information Technology Act was passed by Parliament in 2000 primarily to provide legal recognition to eCommerce and is based on UNCITRAL’s Model Law for Electronic Commerce which the UN General Assembly adopted on January 30, 1997. Section 67 of the Act says:

Whoever publishes or transmits or causes to be published in electronic form, any material which is lascivious or appeals to the prurient interest or if its effect is such as to tend to deprave and corrupt persons who are likely, having regard to all the relevant circumstances, to read, see or hear the matter contained or embodied in it, shall be punished on first conviction with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to five years and with fine which may extend to one lakh rupees and in the event of a second or subsequent conviction with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years and with fine which may extend to two lakh rupees.

Apart from online porn, recently, a large number of men have been morphing photos of women who either dump them or simply reject their advances and posting them on the Net. There doesn’t seem to be very much that can be done about it – once the photos are on the Net, the damage has usually already been done as far as the woman involved is concerned.

Moving away from relationships which have gone sour (assuming they existed in the first place) though, another form of indecent representation which has been much talked about is that which is on TV. Apart from a large number of PILs being filed against various actresses for wearing supposedly indecent clothes in performances, in January 2007, the Government temporarily banned the AXN Channel for showing supposedly indecent content.

While the judiciary has been trying to curtail instances of frivolous public interest litigation being filed by persons suffering from bouts of self-righteousness, the Government has increasingly been making forays into realm of morality although, as Jug Suraiya4 pointed out, “A perverse politics of pornography seems to prevail. A State apparatus which cannot grant its citizens the most basic of life enhancing requirements – primary healthcare, education, gainful employment, safety from violence – shows compensatory zeal in protecting its people from the ill-effects of moral pollutants in their most ingenious of Avatars… even as the regular police turns a blind eye, or worse and acts as an accomplice to rape, murder torture and other obscenities of violence.”

In Bobby Art International v/s Om Pal Singh Hoon, 1996,5 the Supreme Court did not quash the certificate of exhibition of a film which told the story of a tribal girl – Phoolan Devi – whose being exposed to various forms of brutality shown in the film (including gang-rape) turned her into a dreaded dacoit known as the ‘Bandit Queen’. The Court held that the film had to be judged in its entirety and that nakedness did not always arouse a baser instinct.

References:
1. Malarek, Victor; The Natashas; Arcade Publishing; 2003
2. AIR 1965 SC 881
3. Section 2; Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act, 1986
4. Suraiya, Jug; Risque and Porn: Can I& B tell the difference?; The Times of India; 21.1.2007
5. (1996) 4 SCC 1
6. Indian Women: A Socio Legal Perspective; Saikia, N