Privilege and Property. Essays on the History of Copyright.

“What can and can’t be copied is a matter of law, but also of aesthetics, culture, and economics.”

According to its publisher, OpenBook Publishers, this book edited by Martin Kretschmer, with Lionel Bently and Ronan Deazley will trace the history of copyright law, and its emergence from a “a wide range of norms and practices” across a number of countries. The book will also explore the effects of such things as the abolition of the privilege system, and the evolution of the rights associated with the visual and performing arts.

What looks particularly interesting about the book though it the business model being used to publish it. It can be read online free of charge; there are also various paid formats available:

1. digital(pdf) -  £4.95

2.paperback -  £14.95

3. hardback -  £24.95
 
 

PIL Regarding Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose’s Disappearance

For years, the death of Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose has been the subject of conjecture and rumor.

The Times of India reports that a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court comprising Chief Justice S S Nijjar and Justice P C Ghosh admitted a PIL praying that the the Mukherjee Commission be reopened. There is also apparently another writ petition challenging the Centre’s rejection of the Mukherjee Commission report which pending before the bench.

According to Government of India Notification No. S O 339 (E) dated May 14, 1999, Justice Manoj Mukherjee, a retired Supreme Court judge, was appointed to enquire into all the facts and circumstances related to the disappearance of Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose in 1945 and into subsequent developments including:

  1. Whether Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose is dead or alive?
  2. If he is dead whether he died in the plane crash, as alleged?
  3. Whether the ashes in the Japanese temple are ashes of Netaji?
  4. Whether he has died in any other manner at any other place and, if so, when and how?
  5. If he is alive, in respect of his whereabouts.
  6.  

The Commission submitted its report on November 8, 2005 in which it said:

  1. Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose is dead
  2. He did not die in the plane crash, as alleged
  3. The ashes in the Japanese temple are not of Netaji
  4. In the absence of any clinching evidence a positive answer cannot be given
  5. Answer already given above
  6.  

The Government did not agree with the findings of the Commission that Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose did not die in the plane crash and that the ashes in the Japanese Renoki temple are not the ashes of Netaji.

A Russian general had apparently sworn under oath that he had seen documentation which referred to a live Subhas Chandra Bose in Russia.

There were questions regarding the denial of access of archives in Moscow to the Commission. In response to these questions, the Minister of State in the Ministry Of External Affairs, Rao Inderjit Singh, said that the Commission, during its visit to the Russian Federation from 20 to 30 September 2005, visited seven archives.

The Minister said that despite the fact that Russia’s Archive Law, 2004, which is applicable not only to representatives of foreign countries but also Russian citizens, allows access to classified archives, without any exception, only to a strictly defined category of officials, taking into consideration the interest of the Indian side, the Russian government had competent authorities conduct a detailed study of these archives and copies of all documents found with the name of S C Bose, had been handed over to the Indian side. These, in turn, had been given to the Justice Mukherjee Commission.

There have been a number of (conspiracy) theories surrounding the disappearance of Netaji and the PIL filed appears to be yet another attempt to discover what happened to him.

The Origin of Copyright

By Karl Fogel

Copyright is an outgrowth of the privatization of government censorship in sixteenth-century England. There was no uprising of authors suddenly demanding the right to prevent other people from copying their works; far from viewing copying as theft, authors generally regarded it as flattery. The bulk of creative work has always depended, then and now, on a diversity of funding sources: commissions, teaching jobs, grants or stipends, patronage, etc. The introduction of copyright did not change this situation. What it did was allow a particular business model — mass pressings with centralized distribution — to make a few lucky works available to a wider audience, at considerable profit to the distributors.

The first copyright law was a censorship law. It had nothing to do with protecting the rights of authors, or encouraging them to produce new works. Authors’ rights were in no danger in sixteenth-century England, and the recent arrival of the printing press (the world’s first copying machine) was if anything energizing to writers. So energizing, in fact, that the English government grew concerned about too many works being produced, not too few. The new technology was making seditious reading material widely available for the first time, and the government urgently needed to control the flood of printed matter, censorship being as legitimate an administrative function then as building roads.

The method the government chose was to establish a guild of private-sector censors, the London Company of Stationers, whose profits would depend on how well they performed their function. The Stationers were granted a royal monopoly over all printing in England, old works as well as new, in return for keeping a strict eye on what was printed. Their charter gave them not only exclusive right to print, but also the right to search out and confiscate unauthorized presses and books, and even to burn illegally printed books. No book could be printed until it was entered in the company’s Register, and no work could be added to the Register until it had passed the crown’s censor, or had been self-censored by the Stationers. The Company of Stationers became, in effect, the government’s private, for-profit information police force. [1]

The system was quite openly designed to serve booksellers and the government, not authors. New books were entered in the Company’s Register under a Company member’s name, not the author’s name. By convention, the member who registered the entry held the “copyright”, the exclusive right to publish that book, over other members of the Company, and the Company’s Court of Assistants resolved infringement disputes. [2]

This was not simply the latest manifestation of some pre-existing form of copyright. It’s not as though authors had formerly had copyrights, which were now to be taken away and given to the Stationers. The Stationers’ right was a new right, though one based on a long tradition of granting monopolies to guilds as a means of control. Before this moment, copyright — that is, a privately held, generic right to prevent others from copying — did not exist. People routinely printed works they admired when they had the chance, an activity which is responsible for the survival of many of those works to the present day. One could, of course, be enjoined from distributing a specific document because of its potentially libelous effect, or because it was a private communication, or because the government considered it dangerous and seditious. But these reasons are about public safety or damage to reputation, not about property ownership. There had also been, in some cases, special privileges (then called “patents”) allowing exclusive printing of certain types of books. But until the Company of Stationers, there had not been a blanket injunction against printing in general, nor a conception of copyright as a legal property that could be owned by a private party.

For about a century and a third, this partnership worked well for the government and for the Stationers. The Stationers profited from their monopoly, and through the Stationers, the government exercised control over the spread of information. Around the end of the seventeenth century, however, owing to larger political changes, the government relaxed its censorship policies, and allowed the Stationers’ monopoly to expire. This meant that printing would return to its former anarchical state, and was of course a direct economic threat to the members of the Company of Stationers, accustomed as they were to having exclusive license to manufacture books. Dissolution of the monopoly might have been good news for long-suppressed authors and independent printers, but it spelled disaster for the Stationers, and they quickly crafted a strategy to retain their position in the newly liberal political climate.

The Stationers based their strategy on a crucial realization, one that has stayed with publishing conglomerates ever since: authors do not have the means to distribute their own works. Writing a book requires only pen, paper, and time. But distributing a book requires printing presses, transportation networks, and an up-front investment in materials and typesetting. Thus, the Stationers reasoned, people who write would always need a publisher’s cooperation to make their work generally available. Their strategy used this fact to maximum advantage. They went before Parliament and offered the then-novel argument that authors had a natural and inherent right of ownership in what they wrote, and that furthermore, such ownership could be transferred to other parties by contract, like any other form of property.

Their argument succeeded in persuading Parliament. The Stationers had managed to avoid the odium of censorship, as the new copyrights would originate with the author, but they knew that authors would have little choice but to sign those rights back over to a publisher for distribution. There was some judicial and political wrangling over the details, but in the end both halves of the Stationers’ argument survived essentially intact, and became part of English statutory law. The first recognizably modern copyright, the Statute of Anne, was passed in 1709 and took effect in 1710.

The Statute of Anne is often held up by champions of copyright as the moment when authors were finally given the protection they had long deserved. Even today, it continues to be referenced both in legal arguments and in press releases from the publishing industry. But to interpret it as an authors’ victory flies in the face of both common sense and historical fact. [3] Authors, having never had copyright, saw no reason now to suddenly demand the rather paradoxical power to prevent the spread of their own works, and did not do so. The only people threatened by the dissolution of the Stationers’ monopoly were the Stationers themselves, and the Statute of Anne was the direct result of their lobbying and campaigning. In the memorable words of the contemporary Lord Camden, the Stationers “…came up to Parliament in the form of petitioners, with tears in their eyes, hopeless and forlorn; they brought with them their wives and children to excite compassion, and induce Parliament to grant them a statutory security.” [4] To make their argument more palatable, they had proposed that copyright would originate with the author, as a form of property that could be sold to anyone — anticipating, correctly, that it would most often be sold to a printer.

This proposal was a shrewd tactical move, because one of Parliament’s concerns was to prevent the re-establishment of a centralized monopoly in the book trade, with its attendant potential for a renewal of censorship by the crown. Benjamin Kaplan, professor of law emeritus at Harvard University and a respected copyright scholar, describes the Stationers position succinctly:

“….The stationers made the case that they could not produce the fragile commodities called books, and thus encourage learned men to write them, without protection against piracy… There is an apparent tracing of rights to an ultimate source in the fact of authorship, but before attaching large importance to this we have to note that if printing as a trade was not to be put back into the hands of a few as subject of monopoly — if the statute was indeed to be a kind of “universal patent” — a [legal] draftsman would naturally be led to express himself in terms of rights in books and hence to initial rights in authors. A draftsman would anyway be aware that rights would usually pass immediately to publishers by assignment, that is, by purchase of the manuscripts as in the past. … I think it nearer the truth to say that publishers saw the tactical advantage of putting forward authors’ interests together with their own, and this tactic produced some effect on the tone of the statute.”[5]

The Statute of Anne, taken in historical context, is the smoking gun of copyright law. In it we can see the entire apparatus of modern copyright, but in still-undisguised form. There is the notion of copyright as property, yet the property is really intended for publishers, not authors. There is the notion of benefiting society, by encouraging people to write books, but no evidence was offered to show that they would not write books without copyright. Rather, the Stationers’ argument was that publishers could not afford to print books without protection from competition, and furthermore that printers could not be depended to reproduce works faithfully if given unfettered freedom to print. The corollary, they implied, was that without the prospect of reliable distribution, authors would produce fewer new works.

Their argument was not unreasonable, given the technology of the time. Making a perfect copy of a printed work required access to the original press and compositor, anyway; if reliable reproduction were to be encouraged, then a single-holder copyright system had a certain logic to it. And the publishers would now be effectively forced to pay authors in return for exclusive printing rights (although in fact the Stationers had sometimes paid authors even before, simply to guarantee the completion and delivery of a work). The authors who succeeded in selling this new right to printers had no particular motivation to complain — and naturally, we don’t hear very much about the authors not so favored. The consolidation of author’s copyright probably contributed to the decline of patronage as a source of income for writers, [6] and even allowed some authors, though always a small minority, to support themselves solely from the royalties their publishers shared with them. The fact that a given copyright could only held by one party at a time also helped prevent the proliferation of divergent variations, a problem that had vexed authors perhaps even more than plagiarism.

But the overall historical record is clear: copyright was designed by distributors, to subsidize distributors not creators.

This is the secret that today’s copyright lobby never dares say aloud, for once it is admitted, the true purpose of subsequent copyright legislation becomes embarrassingly clear. The Statute of Anne was just the beginning. Having granted the premise that copyrights should exist at all, the English government found themselves under pressure to extend copyright terms further and further. In the long legal saga that ensued, what’s important is not the particular sequence of laws and verdicts, but the identity of the plaintiffs: they were just the sort of stable, settled business interest capable of sustaining litigation and lobbying over a period of decades — that is, they were publishers, not authors. They had proposed the author’s copyright out of economic interest, and only after the crutch of a censorship-based monopoly had been taken away from them. When it became clear that the tactic worked, they lobbied to strengthen copyright.

And this is still the pattern today.

References:
[1] These events can be read in any history of copyright. A good online resource regarding their legal implications is “Copyright And `The Exclusive Right’ Of Authors” http://www.lawsch.uga.edu/jipl/old/vol1/patterson.html Journal of Intellectual Property, Vol. 1, No.1, Fall 1993, by Professor Lyman Ray Patterson, Pope Brock Professor of Law at the University of Georgia and a noted copyright scholar. His description of this earliest copyright is concise and revealing:
The event in the history of Anglo-American copyright that led to the shaping events of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was the Charter of the Stationers’ Company granted in 1556 by Philip and Mary …. The Charter gave the stationers the power to make “ordinances, provisions, and statutes” for the governance of “the art or mistery of [s]tationery,” as well as the power to search out illegal presses and books and things with the power of “seizing, taking, or burning the foresaid books or things, or any of them printed or to be printed contrary to the form of any statute, act, or proclamation ….”
The power to burn offending books was a benefit to the sovereign (a weapon against unlawful publications), and a boon to the stationers (a weapon against competition). The book-burning power thus shows the real motivation for the Charter, to secure the allegiance of the stationers as policemen of the press for the sovereign in an uncertain world.
[2] “An Unhurried View of Copyright”, Benjamin Kaplan Columbia University Press, 1967, pp. 4-5.
[3] Patterson, in [1], goes so far as to say “The characterization of the statutory copyright as an author’s copyright, however, is one of the great canards of history.”
[4] Kaplan, p. 6.
[5] Kaplan, pp. 7-9.
[6] “Five Hundred Years of Printing” pp. 218-230, S. H. Steinberg, Penguin Books, 1955, revised 1961

[This is an excerpt of the original article which can be found at QuestionCopyright.org]

Libel in Fiction

The most famous libel in fiction case is that of Princess Irina Youssoupoff v. MGM [1934] 50 TLR 581 (CA) in which the Princess successfully claimed that she had been defamed in the 1932 movie ‘Rasputin and the Empress’.

The film showed a Princess in it called Natasha having been seduced. The Princess in the film was, however, clearly ‘identifiable’ as Princess Irina Youssoupoff who had in fact been raped and not seduced. One of the defences MGM used was that the Princess had indeed been shown to have been raped and therefore could not be blamed which in turn meant that she had not been defamed. (While this does demonstrate the attitudes towards women which prevailed at the time, that’s something I’ll leave for another day.)

Slesser LJ held that the test should not be whether the plaintiff had been exposed to ridicule, hatred and contempt but if — expanding the Parmiter v Coupland definition — the defamation had caused the plaintiff to be shunned and avoided. He thought that the film was defamatory whether it suggested rape or seduction and said:

“I, for myself, cannot see that from the plaintiff’s point of view it matters in the least whether this libel suggests that she has been seduced or ravished. The question whether she is or is not the more or the less moral seems to me immaterial in considering this question whether she has been defamed, and for this reason, that, as has been frequently pointed out in libel, not only is the matter defamatory if it brings the plaintiff into hatred, ridicule, or contempt by reason of some moral discredit on her part, but also if it tends to make the plaintiff be shunned and avoided and that without any moral discredit on her part. It is for that reason that persons who have been alleged to have been insane, or to be suffering from certain disease, and other cases where no direct moral responsibility could be placed upon them, have been held to be entitled to bring an action to protect their reputation and their honour. One may, I think, take judicial notice of the fact that a lady of whom it has been said that she has been ravished, albeit against her will, has suffered in social reputation and in opportunities of receiving respectable consideration from the world. …. When this woman is defamed in her sexual purity I do not think that the precise manner in which she has been despoiled of her innocence and virginity is a matter which a jury can properly be asked to consider.”

The WSJ Law Blog speaking of another case on the issue which has just been filed says:
“To make out a libel-in-fiction claim — a somewhat counterintuitive theory in which a plaintiff claims that something that is fictional is not factually accurate — Batra [the plaintiff] must demonstrate that the identities of the real and fictional characters are “so complete that the defamatory material” becomes a “plausible aspect” of the plaintiff’s real life.”

Also see:

http://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F2/364/

Proposal to Copyright Egyptian Monuments

Egypt apparently plans to copyright the pyramids and its other antiquities despite the fact that they have been in the public domain for thousands of years now. I’m not entirely certain how it plans to enforce the law or ensure that it can collect royalties. [1]

The issue, I suppose, is whether a photograph or other reproduction of an old work in the public domain constitutes a new work with independent intellectual property rights. Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) [2] clarifies the situation in the United States.

In the case of the Sistine Chapel, the Japanese TV network NHK reportedly paid between three and four million for its restoration in return for exclusive film and publication rights. The Vatican thus managed to turn an ancient artistic work into a commercial property. [3]

The Bridgeman precedent does not apply in the UK and the legal position in most countries still seems to be unclear.

Links:
[1] Proposal to Copyright Egyptian Monuments: http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20071225/lf_afp/egyptantiquitieslaw
[2] Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp.: http://www.law.cornell.edu/copyright/cases/36_FSupp2d_191.htm
[3] Eric Scigliano, Inglorious Restorations, Harper’s Magazine: http://www.harpers.org/archive/2005/08/0080699

Domestic Violence in the Press a Century Ago

After I came across the article about laughter and divorce, I browsed through a few more articles and didn’t really know what to make of them:

In 1881, a Mr Bergh (who had earlier restrained cruelty towards animals) proposed a bill which would punish wife-beaters by flogging them. The article which reported this questioned Mr Bergh’s reverence for the holy institution of marriage and asked how he could denounce honourable and chivalrous men merely because they occasionally knocked down their wives. “What we ought to do,” said the article, “with the person who has inadvertently, or, perhaps in a moment of temporary strength, beaten his wife is to sympathise with him to develop all that is manly and noble in his, and to say or do nothing which can by any possibility lead him to suppose that he has sunk in our estimation. … Moreover, there is reason to believe that a woman does not suffer as much pain form a beating as her husband would suffer were he to be beaten. Most intelligent and trustworthy wife-beaters testify that their wives, when knocked down with a blow of the fist or tapped with a club, rarely make any loud complaint.” [1]

The charge against a German man who was accused of beating his wife with a sledge hammer was dropped in 1897 when he told the Court that, after their marriage, he discovered that his wife was a coloured woman and was not white. I’m not entirely certain how he could have missed noticing that prior to marriage or how it could possibly have justified the assault. Nonetheless, the provocation, such as it was, was held to be sufficient to justify the assault. [2]

The State of Oregon instituted the penalty of the whipping post for wife-beaters for a period of four years before abolishing it in 1911. [3] This was in contrast to an 1883 article which described a battered wife as ‘the real criminal’ and said, “A wife who, when her husband returns home late at night instantly proceeds to be beaten and to awaken with her screams everybody within the radius of a quarter of a mils is simply a nuisance, and in many cases an intolerable nuisance. … Let it be suppressed by intelligent legislation. The law as is now exists clearly recognises that the wife is the offender. The punishment should therefore fall exclusively upon herself, and all attempts to punish her vicariously through her husband should be abandoned. … A wife who is found guilty of being beaten by her husband should be imprisoned for thirty or sixty days according to the gravity of her wounds and if she has any money of her own, she should be compelled to pay a reasonable amount of it to her injured husband.” [4] I’m not sure whether this particular article was meant to satirical or if the author wrote in all seriousness.

Considering that the rights of a gentleman seemed to include wife beating in 1902, the characterisation of abusive husbands as ‘innocent and suffering’ and battered wives as ‘criminal’ may not have been in jest. The author of ‘The Rights of a Gentleman’ contended that ‘killing’ was not the same as ‘inflicting grievous personal injury which, if not interrupted might be attended with untimely fatal consequences’. In this case, a policeman who was informed that a woman was in the process of being killed by her husband and who arrested the husband was described as being over-zealous. After all, as the author pointed out, he acted ‘without stopping to consider whether the provocation might not have been adequate, or the necessity for exemplary discipline sufficiently exigent to make this proceeding entirely proper and commendable.’ [5]


[1] Wife-Beating; February 8, 1881; The New York Times

http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=980CEFD91F3AE533A2575BC0A9649C94609FD7CF

[2] A Matrimonial Mistake February 14, 1897; The New York Times
[3] Oregon ‘s Wife Beaters; February 6, 1911; The New York Times

http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9901E1DC133EE733A25755C0A9649C946096D6CF

[4] The Real Criminal; March 20, 1883; The New York Times

http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9801E3D91631E433A25753C2A9659C94629FD7CF

[5] July 11, 1902; The New York Times

The Administration of Justice in Madras in the Seventeenth Century

The administration of justice in Madras in the seventeenth century can, by and large, be divided into two periods – that between1639 and 1665, and that between 1665 and 1687.

Francis Day acquired a piece of land from a Hindu Raja in 1639. The Company built a Fort on it and called it Fort St. George. The Raja also granted the Company the power and the authority to govern a nearby village called Madraspatam.

Madras, as it came to be known, was an amalgamation of Madraspatam or Black Town where the Indians lived and Fort St George or White Town where the British lived. It was an ‘Agency’ which was subordinate to Surat, the only Presidency of the time. It was headed by an Agent who had a Council to assist him.

During the first period between1639 and 1665, the administration of justice was neither systematic nor regular. For example, when, in 1641, an Indian was accused of murdering a woman he was living with, no formal trial was held. A few questions were asked and the woman’s clothes and jewellery was (not too surprisingly) found in his house. That was deemed to be enough to condemn him, and the Agent communicated his findings to the Raja. The Raja ordered punishment to be inflicted according to English law – the condemned man was hanged to death.

In White Town, it was administered by the Agent in Council who not only had vague and indefinite powers but who also hesitated to use what powers he had in serious criminal cases which were therefore referred to England.

In Black Town, the British did not even initially attempt to administer justice. The allowed the traditional Choultry Courts to function without interference. In these courts, village headmen (known as Adigaars) acted as judges and tried minor civil and criminal offences.

However, in 1652, Adigaar Kanappa was dismissed. He was apparently corrupt and, among other things, connived to steal children and sell them as slaves. He was replaced by two British servants of the Company who tried petty cases – there is no record of the establishment of any Court which could try cases beyond the competence of the Choultry Court.

It was only in time that the British became more comfortable with using the judicial powers they had been granted.

A major change was heralded by the case of Mrs A Dawes in 1665. The Agent and Council were uncertain of how to handle her case, so they referred the matter to the Company in England. In response to this, the Company made Madras a Presidency and raised the status of the Agent to a Governor so that the Charter of 1661 which conferred wide judicial powers on the Governor and Council – but not on the Agent and Council – could be made operational in Madras.

This Charter empowered the Governor and Council to try not only Britons but also all those who lived in the settlement. In theory, English law was to be administered but since the Governor and Council knew no law, this did not happen and the quality of the administration of justice was poor.

Justice also took a long time to be administered because of delays while consulting Company authorities in England. For example, there is a record of a case dated January 31, 1678, of an Englishman who languished as a pre-trial for 31 months. Although he was accused of killing another Englishman, he was ultimately found guilty of manslaughter in self-defence and his goods and chattels were forfeited to the King.

Streynsham Master who was the Governor between 1667 and 1681 tried to improve the situation.

The High Court of Judicature comprising the Governor and Council which was to sit for two days a week was finally established in 1678. It was formed to try criminal cases and major civil cases, and had original jurisdiction in matters beyond the powers of the Choultry Court which was reorganized at the same time. It also had appellate jurisdiction to hear appeals from the Choultry Court.

The reorganization of the Choutry Court did away with the traditional system and replaced Adigaars with servants of the company: the mint master, the pay master and the customer or any two of them. It had jurisdiction to try minor misdemeanors, matters of peace, civil matters involving less than 50 pagodas (or more if the parties involved gave their consent thereto).

With the reorganization of the judicial system, the administration of justice in Madras came to be on a much firmer footing.

References: Outlines of Indian Legal History, M P Jain; Indian Courts, K Rai; A Chronicle of British Indian Legal History, A Hamid