Another Incident of Ragging

Every once in a while, the news of a student dying because of ragging hits headlines. Usually, it’s followed by a few debates on the telly after which everyone but those involved in and affected by the issue forget all about it. Until the next time it happens.

On March 16, 2009, the issue came up before the Supreme Court following the death of Aman Kachroo, a student of Dr Rajendra Prasad Medical College, Kangra, Himachal Pradesh. Aman was ragged following which he died. It isn’t entirely clear what exactly it was that caused him to die: he suffered a perforated eardrum and internal injuries but there are queries about whether the doctor who attended to him was negligent in treating him.

In addition to this, Additional Solicitor General Gopal Subramaniam also spoke of the death of a girl student of Agriculture and Engineering College, Bapatla, Andhra Pradesh after allegedly being
forced to dance obscenely.

The Supreme Court did not take the issue lightly and Justices Arijit Pasayat and A K Ganguly issued a show cause notice to the Principal and Registrar of the Dr Rajendra Prasad Medical College asking them to explain why contempt proceedings should not be initiated against them for not complying with the court’s directions to prevent ragging.

The notice issued by the Supreme Court also required the Principal and Registrar of the Medical College to state what action was taken after the ragging incident was brought to their notice. In addition to this, the court asked the Medical Council of India to inquire into the allegations of medical negligence against the doctor who treated Aman, and the Chief Secretaries and Directors General of Himachal Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh to file separate affidavits stating what they have done to comply with the court’s earlier directions and what action has been taken against the two institutions as well as against the students who did the ragging.

Justice Arijit Pasayat said in no uncertain terms, “It appears that the concern shown by this court has not been taken seriously by the authorities. Prima facie it is contempt of this court. The directions issued by this court on May 16, 2007 and February 11, 2009 on the basis of the R K Raghavan Committee Report to end the menace have not been complied with. Time has come for cutting off financial age to there institutions which are not complying with the directions.”

Perhaps the possibility of this happening i.e. financial support being cut will actually get institutions to do what they can to stop ragging. The University Grants Commission has also said that it will finalise stringent rules on the issue by the first week of April 2009.

The intervention of the Supreme Court and the measures of the UGC come too late for the students who have alreay lost their lives but, with any luck, they will help others in the future.

References:

The Times of India, The Hindu, Indlaw,  IndiaJournal

The National Flower

It doesn’t seem too unreasonable at first glance to say that a national symbol should not be used by a political party for political gain. That is essentially what Shaheen Parvez has been saying for some five years now. However, on March 16, 2009, the Supreme Court dismissed a Special Leave Petition she filed on the issue.

It was contended in the SLP that the lotus which is the BJP’s symbol cannot be used by the party because such use would be against the Emblems and Names (Prevention of Improper Use) Act. This is the statute which prevents such symbols as the Ashoka Chakra (and a whole host of others) from being used in a number of ways such as in the names of commercial establishments.

This SLP which sought the cancellation of the lotus symbol allotted to the BJP was made against a December 2008 Delhi High Court Order and was dismissed at the admission stage itself by a Bench of the Supreme Court comprising Chief Justice K G Balakrishnan, Justice Sirpurkar and Justice Sathashivam.

The petitioner said that she wrote letters to the Election Commission in 2004 and 2005 asking for the cancellation of the symbol but the Commission turned her down saying that the symbol had been reserved by the BJP for some twenty-five years prior to which it had been used by independents. It was after this that the petitioner approached the Delhi High Court. After failing there too, she approached the Supreme Court.

The apex Court, however, did nothing at all towards preventing the party from using the symbol.

Reference: The Hindu; March 17, 2009

Public Displays of Affection

There’ve been a number of instances of late in urban areas about morality and the law. One which was widely discussed was the Mangalore incident where persons with political affiliations seem to have assaulted women who were drinking in a pub. Apparently, they were acting as the moral police although it isn’t clear why drinking was considered immoral or how they could possibly be policing anything or anyone since drinking per se is not ordinarily illegal.

Nonetheless, there were people who spoke of vigilantes taking (non-existent) law(s) into their own hands. The story was covered by every newspaper, TV channel and almost every blog. And everyone against women drinking spoke long and loud about its being against Indian Culture.

Soon after, there was another report of a PDA which came from Delhi. This one didn’t have anything to do with alcohol but spoke of policemen having charged a young, married couple with obscenity for kissing each other under a metro pillar in Dwarka, Delhi. The couple said that they weren’t kissing each other – they were taking pictures of themselves with a cell phone – and that the policemen (and their lawyer) were trying to extort money from them. Ultimately, they approached the Delhi High Court to have the FIR filed against them quashed. Among other things, they said that while they were being interrogated, the husband’s ATM card was used to unburden him of 20,000 INR.

The High Court while saying that the FIR was difficult to believe since there were no passers-by or witnesses whose statements were attached to it. Indian law does not define obscenity: it is left entirely to the judiciary to interpret what is and is not obscene.  The couple had been accused of having violated sections 294 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code. Under section 294, whoever, to the annoyance of others does any obscene act in any public place, or sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place is to be punished with either simple or rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine, or with both. Section 34, however, deals with acts done by several persons in furtherance of a common intention. Under the Section, when a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone.

One problem with accusing the couple with obscenity was the lack of witnesses: the law requires the obscene act to annoy others. If it’s an act which no one has seen, it does not fall within the parameters of the Section 294 of Indian Penal Code.

The Court also said that even if the couple were in fact kissing, there could be nothing wrong in their doing so, and it expressed surprise that the police chose to ignore the fact that the couple were married. Justice Muralidhar said: “The FIR doesn’t make a case for offence under Section 294 (obscenity) read with 34 IPC. It is inconceivable how, even if one were to take what is stated in the FIR to be true, an expression of love by a young married couple would attract the offence of obscenity and trigger the coercive process of law.”

While it’s certainly something that the High Court did in fact step in to protect the couple, what was striking was the emphasis on the couple being married. Does that mean that if the couple was not married, their having done exactly the same thing would have been considered obscene?

Reference: Times of India, February 3, 2009

The Interpretation of Section 73 of the Companies Act

Intention of the Legislature

Section 73 was amended in 1970 after the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Allied International Products Ltd. (1970) 3 SCC 594.

The notes on clauses of the Companies Amendment Act (1974) say:
“Sec. 73 prescribes a certain time limit for enlistment with the stock exchanges. It also contemplates that enlistment has to be done in all the stock exchanges mentioned in the prospectus and in case of failure to do so, the money received in respect of allotment of shares on the basis of the prospectus should be refunded within a specified time. In Union of India v. Allied International Products Ltd. (1970) 3 SCC 594, the Supreme Court held that if a stock exchange had intimated that it would give further consideration to an application the time-limit contemplated by the section will not operate. It has also held that if any of the stock exchanges mentioned in the prospectus approved the application for enlistment, it would mean sufficient compliance with the provisions of section 73 and the allotment made in pursuance of that prospectus would be valid.
It has been felt that the decision of the Supreme Court referred to above is likely to lead to complications inasmuch as the investing public as well as underwriting institutions are likely to lose the protection hitherto enjoyed by them. Hence s. 73 is being amended suitably.”
(A Ramaiya, Guide to the Companies Act, 16th Ed., 2004, page 890)

The view that s 73 needed to amended after the decision in Union of India v. Allied International Products Ltd. finds support in the Bombay High Court judgment of Deccan Farms & Distilleries Ltd. v. Velabai Laxmidas Bhanji [1979]49CompCas321(Bom) / Para 16 Manupatra which says:
“The language of s. 73 is simple and clear. This section had been amended by the Companies (Amendment) Act, 1974, whereby greater protection was sough to be given to the investing public, underwriting institutions and trade than higher to before. It also became necessary for the government to have a second look at some of the provisions of s. 73 in view of the judgment in Union of India v. Allied International Products Ltd. (1970) 3 SCC 594. Looking to the interest of the investing public, the rate of interest was enhanced from six per cent. to twelve per cent. by the 1974 Amendment, so that the investor received the repayment at a higher interest when the allotment became void under s. 73(1). The 1974 Amendment brought about the substitution of sub-ss. (1) and (5) and insertion of sub-ss. (2A), (2B), (3A), and amendment of some other provisions of s. 73 in order to provide several safeguards, but in real life these provisions can be set at naught as in the present case.”

Being a cardinal rule of interpretation that the intention of the legislature is to be given effect to, it is submitted that the period of ten weeks cannot be extended under any circumstances. Further, all of the stock exchanges must give permission within the period of ten weeks for the issue to be valid particularly since Sec. 73 clearly states in ss (1A) that permission must be given by each of the stock exchanges applied to and that the only way an issue can be ‘saved’ is if an appeal is filed against the refusal of a stock exchange.

This was also the opinion of the Supreme Court in the case of Rishyashringa Jewellery Ltd. v. Stock Exchange, (1995) 6 SCC 714, at page 719 where it was held:
“Thus, where the prospectus held out that enlistment of shares would be in more than one stock exchange the consequence envisaged in sub-section (1-A) of Section 73 ensues to render void the entire allotment of shares unless the permission is granted by each and everyone or all of the stock exchanges named in the prospectus for enlisting the shares. This is the plain meaning of sub-section (1-A) of Section 73. In short, unless permission is granted by each or every one of all the stock exchanges named in the prospectus for listing of shares to which application is made by the company, the consequence is to render the entire allotment void. In other words, if the permission has not been granted by any one of the several stock exchanges named in the prospectus for listing of shares the consequence by virtue of sub-section (1-A) of Section 73 is to render the entire allotment void and the grant of permission by one of them is inconsequential. This construction also promotes the object of insertion of sub-section (1-A) in Section 73 by amendment of the law made to overcome the effect of the decision of this Court in Allied International Products Ltd. (AIR 1951 Supreme Court 251)”

Further, in the case of Raymond Synthetics Ltd. v. Union of India, (1992) 2 SCC 255, in which it was held that the liability of company to repay money received from applicants for shares or debentures in excess of the aggregate of the application money related to the allotted shares and debentures arises only on the expiry of ten weeks from the date of closure of the subscription list, it was held at paras 11 and 28 respectively:
“This provision makes it necessary for the company to state in its prospectus the name of each of the recognised stock exchanges whose permission for listing has been sought by the company. Any allotment of shares will become void if permission is not granted by the stock exchange or each such stock exchange, as the case may be, before the expiry of 10 weeks from the date of the closing of the subscription lists. The validity of the allotment is thus made dependent on securing the requisite permission of each stock exchange whose permission has been sought. The liability to repay the application money arises only upon refusal of the stock exchange to grant the permission sought by the company before the expiry of 10 weeks from the date of closing of the subscription lists. This is clear from Sub-section (1A) read with Sub-section (5). There is a deemed refusal if permission is not granted by the stock exchange before the expiry of 10 weeks from the date of closing of the subscription lists, and upon the expiry of that date, any allotment of shares made by the company becomes void.” …
“Sub-section (1A) postulates that any allotment made becomes void at the end of 10 weeks from the date of the closing of the subscription lists if by that time the requisite permission of the stock exchange has not been obtained. But this consequence is postponed till the dismissal of any appeal preferred under Section 22 of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 (see the proviso to Sub-section (1A) of Section 73 of the Act). Nevertheless, the permission, if not obtained within 10 weeks, is deemed not to have been granted.”

The Repayment of Money

Section 73 clearly provides for the repayment of money in ss (2), (2A) and (3).

In The Commissioner of Income-tax v. Henkel SPIC India Ltd. [2004]266ITR490(Mad), the Madras High Court held:

“In cases where the failure to allot shares is for reasons other than those already referred to, then also the company would become liable for repayment of money. The grace period of eight days given to the company under section 73(2) for effecting repayment without interest will not apply to cases where liability is incurred for a reason other than those specified in sub-section (2). Applicants in such cases would be entitled to claim interest for the entire period during which the application moneys were wrongfully held by the company. In cases covered by section 73(2), for any delay beyond the first eight days after liability for repayment has been incurred, the company is liable to pay interest at the prescribed rate which under the Rule 4D is 15 per cent.”

Further, Rule 4D of the Companies (Central Government’s) General Rules, 1956 clearly says:
The rates of interest for the purposes of subsections (2) and (2A) of section 73 shall be 15% per annum.

The Lowest Possible Sentence

Judges of high courts have been exercising much discretion in awarding sentences for various offences by reducing the sentences awarded by lower courts. For example, the High Court of Bombay let off a person convicted in an acid attack case with a sentence which amounted to 35 days in gaol.

In some instances, the courts have even awarded sentences which are lower than the minimum sentences mandated by law. The Supreme Court hasn’t been too pleased with this trend and it has asked judges not to ordinarily exercise their discretion so as to go below the minimum sentence prescribed by Parliament saying, “If Parliament has provided  for a minimum sentence, the same should ordinarily be imposed save and except in some exceptional cases…”

A Bench of the Supreme Court comprising Justices  S B Sinha and Cyriac Joseph said this in a case under the Essential Commodities Act. A kerosene dealer who had been found to commit irregularities in the storage of kerosene appealled to the apex court for leniency after being sentenced to six months in gaol. He argued that the Essential Commodities Act itself provides for a sentence of less than six months if the Judge finds special reasons in favour of the accused. Finding no such reasons, the court dismissed his appeal.

The Supreme Court also said: “Ordinarily, the legislative sentencing policy as laid in some Special Acts where the parliamentary intent has been expressed in unequivocal terms should be applied. Sentence of less than the minimum prescribed by Parliament may be imposed only in exceptional cases.”

Victims can get Bail Revoked

Bail granted to those accused of perpetrating crimes can be cancelled.Section 437(5) of the CrPc says that any court which has released a person on bail (for a non-bailable offence) may, if it considers it necessary to do so, direct that such person be arrested and commit him to custody.Special powers are reposed in the High Court and Court of sessions under sec 439(2) whereby either court may direct that any person who has been released on bail be arrested and committed to custody.Usually, bail is cancelled because of the accused having misused bail.

In Public Prosecutor v. George Williams (1951 Mad 1042) the Madras High Court pointed out five grounds on which a bail could be cancelled:

(a)Where the person on bail, during the period of the bail, commits the very same offence for which is being tried or has been convicted, and thereby proves his utter unfitness to be on bail;

(b)If he hampers the investigation as will be the case if he, when on bail; forcibly prevents the search of place under his control for the corpus delicti or other incriminating things;

(c)If he tampers with the evidence, as by intimidating the prosecution witness, interfering with scene of the offence in order to remove traces or proofs of crime, etc.

(d)If he runs away to a foreign country, or goes underground, or beyond the control of his sureties; and

(e)If he commits acts of violence, in revenge, against the police and the prosecution witnessed & those who have booked him or are trying to book him

However, in what appears to be a landmark judgment, a bench of the Supreme Court comprising Justices Tarun Chatterjee and V S Sirpurkar have ruled that bail can be revoked if the accused is facing charges of having committed a crime such as murder and the victim of the crime raises valid objections to the grant of bail.

Observing that ‘the complainant can always question the merits of the order granting bail’, the Supreme Court came to this conclusion in the case of Brij Nandan Jaiswal v Munna @ Munna Jaiswal & Anr. The Bench categorically stated that ‘it is not as if once a bail as granted be any court, the only way to get it cancelled is on account of its misuse’.

 

 

 

 
 

 

 

Absurd Reason for Rape Acquittal

If there ever was a crazy reason to let a man get away with rape, it’d have to be this reasoning behind the judgement of the Orissa High Court: “Law is well settled that it is not possible for a single man to commit sexual intercourse with a healthy adult female in full possession of her senses against her will.”

 At first glance, the reasoning is just about as ‘sound’ as it was in the “Jeans are difficult for another to remove. Therefore, a woman who was wearing them could not have been raped.” case and as repugnant as Judge Archie Simonson’s “Women are sex objects whether or not they like it.” logic.

 

In the case in which the High Court came up with this extraordinary pronouncement, a healthy tribal woman whom the High Court deemed capable of resisting rape was raped and there was only one witness to the crime. The High Court concluded that the perpetrator had either been falsely accused or that the sex was consensual. The court based its conclusions upon the reasoning that there was no evidence of any resistance on the part of the woman.

 

Luckily, the Supreme Court did not agree with the it. On December 16, 2008 Justices Arijit Pasayat and Mukundam Sharma quashed the acquittal order passed by the High Court and proclaimed:

 

“The conclusions are not only confusing but border on absurdity.” The apex court also professed itself to be baffled as to why the HC said that the law says that it is impossible for a single man to rape a healthy woman who was in possession of her senses since, as it pointed out, “there is not even a single decision which says so.”

 

The Supreme Court also reprimanded the High Court judge for failing to adhere to judicial discipline by disclosing the name of the rape victim.

 

(The relevant case is State of Orissa v Sukru Gouda.)