When an Insurance Company’s Liability Begins

The liability of an insurer begins only after the encashment of the cheque and not before ruled a Bench of the Supreme Court comprising Justices S.B. Sinha and Lokeshwar Singh Panta in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Yellamma & Anr. on May 5, 2008.

In this case, the owner of a Mini Bus sought an insurance policy in respect of the vehicle. To this end, he issued a third party cheque towards payment of insurance premium. Once the Development Officer of the insurance company realised this, he contacted the vehicle owner and asked him to pay the premium which was apparently not done.

The said insurance cover was issued for the period 3.9.1991 to 2.9.1992. On or about 12.9.1991, the vehicle met with an accident. Yellama who was injured therein filed a claim petition in terms of the provisions contained in Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (the Act). An award for a sum of Rs.43,000/- was made.

The High Court increased the amount of compensation to Rs.1,50,000/-. The insurance company then appealed to the Supreme Court which held that a contract of insurance like any other contract is a contract between the insured and the insurer. The amount of premium is required to be paid as a consideration for arriving at a concluded contract. If the insurer insists that a cheque should be issued only by the insured and not by a third party, no exception thereto can be taken. The fact remains that the cheque was not encashed. Concededly, the insured did not make any payment.

Section 64VB of the Insurance Act, 1938 mandates that before a contract of insurance comes into being, the premium should be received by the insurer in advance, stating :

No risk to be assumed unless premium is received in advance:
(1) No insurer shall assume any risk in India in respect of any insurance business on which premium is not ordinarily payable outside India unless and until the premium payable is received by him or is guaranteed to be paid by such person in such manner and within such time as may be prescribed or unless and until deposit of such amount as may be prescribed, is made in advance in the prescribed manner.
(2) For the purposes of this section, in the case of risks for which premium can be ascertained in advance, the risk may be assumed not earlier than the date on which the premium has been paid in cash or by cheque to the insurer.
Explanation: Where the premium is tendered by postal money order or cheque sent by post, the risk may be assumed on the date on which the money order is booked or the cheque is posted, as the case may be.

The question came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Deddaooa & Ors. v. Branch Manager, National Insurance Co. Ltd. [(2008) 2 SCC 595], wherein upon noticing the precedents which were operating in the field, it was clearly held :

“18. The ratio of the said decision was, however, noticed by this Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Rula and Ors. [(2003) 3 SCC 195]. It was held that ordinarily a liability under the contract of insurance would arise only on payment of premium, if such payment was made a condition precedent for taking effect of the insurance policy but such a condition which is intended for the benefit of the insurer can be waived by it.”

The dicta laid down therein clarifies that if on the date of accident the policy subsists, then only the third party would be entitled to avail the benefit therof.

In National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Seema Malhotra and Ors. [(2001) 3 SCC 151], a Division Bench noticed both the aforementioned decisions and analysed the same in the light of Section 64-VB of the 1938 Act. It was held:

’17. In a contract of insurance when the insured gives a cheque towards payment of premium or part of the premium, such a contract consists of reciprocal promise. The drawer of the cheque promises the insurer that the cheque, on presentation, would yield the amount in cash. It cannot be forgotten that a cheque is a bill of exchange drawn on a specified banker. A bill of exchange is an instrument in writing containing an unconditional order directing a certain person to pay a certain sum of money to a certain person. It involves a promise that such money would be paid.

18. Thus, when the insured fails to pay the premium promised, or when the cheque issued by him towards the premium is returned dishonoured by the bank concerned the insurer need not perform his part of the promise. The corollary is that the insured cannot claim performance from the insurer in such a situation.

19. Under Section 25 of the Contract Act an agreement made without consideration is void. Section 65 of the Contract Act says that when a contract becomes void any person who has received any advantage under such contract is bound to restore it to the person from whom he received it. So, even if the insurer has disbursed the amount covered by the policy to the insured before the cheque was returned dishonoured, the insurer is entitled to get the money back.

20. However, if the insured makes up the premium even after the cheque was dishonoured but before the date of accident it would be a different case as payment of consideration can be treated as paid in the order in which the nature of transaction required it. … A contract is based on reciprocal promise. Reciprocal promises by the parties are condition precedents for a valid contract. A contract furthermore must be for consideration.”

In today’s world payment by cheque is ordinarily accepted as valid tender but the same would be subject to its encashment. A distinction, however, exists between the statutory liability of the insurance company vis-à-vis the third party in terms of Sections 147 and 149 of the Motor Vehicles Act and its liability in other cases but it is clear that if the contract of insurance had been cancelled and all concerned had been intimated thereabout, the insurance company would not be liable to satisfy the claim.

In this case, there cannot be any doubt or dispute whatsoever that no privity of contract came into being between the insurance company and the owner of the vehicle and as such the question of enforcing the purported contract of insurance while taking recourse to Section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act did not arise.

Being of the opinion that the interest of justice would be subserved by the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, the Supreme Court directed that the awarded amount be paid by the insurance company to Yellama with liberty to it to recover the same from the owner of the vehicle by initiating an appropriate proceeding in this behalf.

(This article is an edited extract of the judgment.)

Election Malpractice Allegations ‘Cock and Bull Story’

“The election petition is a serious matter and it cannot be treated lightly or in fanciful manner nor is it given to a person who uses this as a handle for vexatious purpose,” said a Bench of the Supreme Court in a case in which the allegations made in the election petition appeared to the Court to be totally a cock and bull story.

The case was that of Sudarsha Avasthi v. Shiv Pal Singh decided by Justices A K Mathus and Altamas Kabir on May 16, 2008. In this case, a voter, Sudarsha Avasthi challenged the election of Shivpal Singh to the UP Legislative Council from the Lucknow Division Graduate’s Constituency saying that Singh had indulged in corrupt practices.

Avasthi filed an election petition praying for a declaration that Shiv Pal Singh’s election to the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Council to be declared void. An application was also filed under Order VI Rule 16 read with Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure praying for the dismissal of the election petition.

As per Section 83 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, it is the duty of the person who files the election petition and levels the allegation of corrupt practice, he has to disclose the material facts on which he relies and that should set forth the full particulars of a corrupt practice that the petitioner alleges including the full statement as far as possible disclosing the names of the parties alleged to have committed such corrupt practice and the date and place of commission of each such practice and the same shall be filed by the petitioner and verified in the manner as laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure. Apart from this, he has to file an affidavit in prescribed form in support of the allegation of such corrupt practice and he should disclose the particulars thereof. If he wants to rely on any document then it should be annexed to the petition signed by the petitioner and verified in the same manner as the petition. Section 123 of the Act deals with corrupt practices.

What shall be corrupt practices have been enumerated in Section 123 of the Act, like; bribery which has been defined that any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsoever, with the object, directly or indirectly of including a person to stand or not to stand as, or to withdraw or not to withdraw from being a candidate at an election or an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.

Therefore, the detailed particulars are required to be given that how a person is being bribed by various modes.

All these particulars have to be given in the manner provided in Section 83 of the Act.

With reference to various cases,* the Supreme Court noted that the election petition should contain the allegation of bribery in a concise manner with material particulars.

It then held that the material particulars disclosed in this case were not sufficient.

* Cases

i) AIR 1982 SC 1559; Roop Lal Sathi v. Machhattar Singh
ii) (1991) 3 SCC 375; F.A.Sapa & Ors. v. Singora & Ors.
iii) (1999) 4 SCC 274; T.M.Jacob v. C.Poulose & Ors.
iv) (2004) 11 SCC 196; Sardar Harcharan Singh Brar v. Sukh Darshan Singh & Ors.
v) (2005) 13 SCC 511; Harkirat Singh v. Amrinder Singh

(This article is an edited extract of the judgment.)

DTAA with Luxembourg Announced

The Ministry of Finance has announced that the Government of India has signed a Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA) with the Government of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg.

It has said that:

‘The DTAA covers income-tax and wealth tax including any surcharge thereon in the case of India. It covers income tax on individuals, corporation tax, capital tax and communal trade tax in the case of Luxembourg.

The rate of tax in the country of source cannot exceed ten percent of the gross amount of payment in case the beneficial owner of the payments (of dividend, interest, royalties, etc.) is a resident of the other country.

Capital gains from the alienation of shares are taxable in the country of the company’s residence.

Double taxation is avoided by each country giving credit for taxes paid by its residents in the other country.

To deal with fiscal evasion, information can be exchanged in cases which are under investigation in either country. Also, both countries are to assist each other in the collection of revenue.’

With reference to another DTAA, in a 2008 judgment which dismissed the IT Department’s plea to tax Hyundai Heavy India Co. Ltd. at a higher rate, a Bench the Supreme Court reportedly said, “[T]he provisions of Section 90 (2) [of the Finance Act] does not say that DTAA will override the provisions of the Finance Act. Tax rate prescribed by an Act of Parliament cannot be whittled down by reference to the provisions of an earlier assessment.”

A Tenant finds the Law is Reason without Emotion

The general rule is that welfare statutes are to be construed as liberally as possible but whether or not a statute is a welfare statute, it cannot be given an interpretation which is simply not consistent with its provisions.

On May 13, 2008, a Bench of the Supreme Court comprising Justices S B Sinha and L S Panta refused to stay an eviction from rented business premises by a landlord who wanted the premises for his own business in the case of Ganga Devi v. Distt. Judge, Nainital & Ors..

The tenant was a 76-year-old widow named Ganga Devi who prayed for the eviction to be stayed because of her being a 76-year-old widow. Her husband, Khyali Ram, had earlier been a tenant in the premises. After his death, she took over the business.

The landlord applied for the release of the shop before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nainital under Section 21 (1)(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. His application was dismissed by the Prescribed Authority but the Appellate Authority reversed the order. The writ petition filed by Ganga Devi thereagainst was dismissed by the High Court.

Section 41 of the Act provides for the rule making power. Rule 16(2) of the State of U.P. known as U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rentand Eviction) Rules, says:

16. Application for release on the ground of personal requirement:
(1)………………………
(2) While considering an application for release under Section 21 (1)(a)in respect of a building let out for purposes of any business, the Prescribed Authority shall also have regard to such facts as the following:

(a) the greater the period since when the tenant opposite party, or the original tenant whose heir the opposite party is, has been carrying on his business in that building, the less the justification for allowing the application;
(b) Where the tenant has available with him suitable accommodation to which he can shift his business without substantial loss there shall be greater justification for allowing the application.
(c) the greater the existing business of the landlord’s own, apart from the business proposed to be set up in the leased premises, the less the justification for allowing the application, and even if an application is allowed in such a case, the prescribed authority may on the application of the tenant impose the condition where the landlord has available with him other accommodation (whether subject to the Act or not) which is not suitable for his own proposed business but may serve the purpose of the tenant, that the landlord shall let out that accommodation to the tenant on a fair rent to be fixed by the prescribed authority;
(d) where a son or unmarried or widowed or divorced or judicially separated daughter of a male lineal descendant of the landlord has, after the building was originally let out, completed his or her technical education and is not employed in Government service, and wants to engage in self employment, his or her need shall be given due consideration.

When the matter reached the Supreme Court, the Court said:

Comparative hardship, indisputably, is a relevant factor for determining the question as to whether the requirement of the landlord is bona fide or not within the meaning of the provisions of the said Act and the Rules. It is essentially a question of fact. Such a question of fact, however, is to be determined on the touchstone of the statutory provisions as contained in Section 21(1)(a) and Rules 16(2)(c) of the Rules.

Rule 16 provides for some factors which are required to be taken into consideration for the purpose of determining the comparative hardship.

The provisions of the statutory rules must be interpreted so as to give effect to the object and purport of the Act. It cannot be applied in a vacuum, as the statute requires comparison of the hardship of both the tenant as also the landlord. It is, therefore, not a case where Rule 16 has any application.

The court would not determine a question only on the basis of sympathy or sentiment. Stricto sensu equity as such may not have any role to play.

(This post is an edited extract of the judgment.)

What Constitutes 100% Disability?

An amputation of the right leg up to the knee joint amounts to 100% disability ruled a Bench of the Supreme Court comprising Justices Harjit Singh Bedi and Tarun Chatterjee in the case of K Janardhan v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. & Anr. on May 9, 2008.

In this case, a tanker driver, while driving his vehicle met with an accident with a tractor coming from the opposite side. He suffered serious injuries and had an amputation of the right leg up to the knee joint.

He then moved an application before the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation praying that as he was 25 years of age and earning Rs. 3,000/- per month and had suffered 100% disability, he was entitled to a sum of Rs. 5 lac by way of compensation.

The Commissioner observed that the claimant was 30 years old and the salary as claimed by him was on the higher side and accordingly determined the same at Rs. 2000/- per month. He also found that as the claimant had suffered an amputation of his right leg up to the knee, he was said to have suffered a loss of 100% of his earning capacity as a driver and accordingly determined the compensation payable to him at Rs. 2,49,576/- and interest @ 12% p.a. thereon from the date of the accident.

The insurance company then appealed to the High Court which accepted that as per the Schedule to the Workmen’s Compensation Act, the loss of a leg on amputation amounted to a 60% reduction in the earning capacity and as the doctor had opined to a 65% disability, this figure was to be accepted and accordingly reduced the compensation.

The driver then approached the Supreme Court saying that being a tanker driver, the loss of his right leg ipso facto meant a total disablement as understood in terms of Section 2(1)(e) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act and as such he was entitled to have compensation computed on that basis.

He relied on Narain Singh Deo v. Srinivas Sabata & Anr. (1976) 1 SCC 289 in which a carpenter who had suffered an amputation of his left arm from the elbow was held to have suffered a total disability as the injury was of such a nature that the claimant had been disabled from all work which he was capable of performing at the time of the accident. It was observed that:

5. The expression “total disablement” has been defined in Section 2(1)(e) of the Act as follows:
“(1) `total disablement’ means such disablement whether of a temporary or permanent nature, as incapacitates workman for all work which he was capable of performing at the time of the accident resulting in such disablement.”

Applying the ratio of this judgment to the facts of the present case the Supreme Court held that the driver had also suffered a 100% disability. Under Sections 8 and 9 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1988, he would be disqualified from even getting a driving licence.

(This article is an edited extract of the judgment.)

Unconscionable Contracts

“This contract is so one-sided, I am astonished to find it written on both sides of the paper.” – Lord Evershed M.R.

The Doctrine of Unconscionability is one of the exceptions to the freedom of parties to contract. It comes into play where bargaining power is not evenly distributed. As a general rule, as long as a contract involves some form of consideration, courts do not get involved. However, if a contract is excessively one-sided, courts are willing to step in and come to the aid of the injured party.

Section 16 of the Indian Contract Act 1972 deals with undue influence. It says that a contract is said to be induced by undue influence if one of the parties is in a position to dominate the will of the other and uses that position to obtain an unfair advantage over the other. For example, a person who is in a position of authority over another, or who stands in a fiduciary relation to the other, or who makes a contract with a person of sub-normal mental capacity is deemed to be in a position to dominate the will of that other person. If, in such situations, the transaction appears, on the face of it or on the evidence adduced, to be unconscionable the person who is in a position to dominate the will of the other is required to prove that the contract was not induced by undue influence.

Further, under Section 19A of the Act, the party whose consent was obtained by undue influence may choose to avoid the contract. The Court may set the contract aside either absolutely or, if the party entitled to avoid it has received any benefit under it, upon such terms and conditions which the Court thinks are just.

However, the application of the doctrine under Indian statutory law is on a much firmer footing under Section 23 of the Act which says that the consideration or object of an agreement is not lawful if it is immoral, or opposed to public policy. And if the consideration or object is not lawful, the contract is void and unenforceable.

Deciding whether or not a contract is unconscionable though is often difficult to do – in some instances, it is obvious such as in Employment Contracts which contain absurdly broad non-compete clauses or in boilerplate contracts which favour sellers and other drafters. In others, however, it is more difficult to tell the difference between a well negotiated deal (for one party) and between the imposition of an unconscionable contract term on another party to the contract. Also, the decision as to whether or not a contract is actually unconscionable relies heavily on morality. As such, the factors which come into play to reach a decision are decidedly subjective.

Augusto C. Lima says, “The defense of freedom of contract, which finds contemporary resonance in the economic analysis of contract law, usually entails the narrow application of unconscionability. The concept of unconscionability for such a purpose is narrowed by the assignment of a procedural, rather than substantive, nature to it. In such a procedural view, unconscionability is but a device to fill in the gap between a defect in contract formation (such as fraud or duress) and unconscionability as substantive unfairness (focused on the morality of the transaction),” in ‘When Harry Met Kreutziger: A Look into Unconscionability Through the Lenses of Culture‘.

Indian courts have generally been willing to interfere in boilerplate contracts on the ground that they are unconscionable. However, proving unconscionability in other situations can be an uphill task in the absence of clear evidence either within the agreement itself or otherwise.


Some Indian cases on the subject:

  1. Chairman and MD, NTPC Ltd. v. Reshmi Constructions, Builders and Contractors, 2004
  2. LIC of India v. Consumer Education Research Centre, 1995
  3. Delhi Transport Corporation v. DTC Mazdoor Congress, 1990
  4. Bihar SEB v. Green Rubber Industries, 1989
  5. Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly, 1986
  6. Pierce Leslie and Co. Ltd. v. Violet Ouchterlony Wapshare, 1968

(This article is by Nandita Saikia and was first published at LawMatters.in.)

Customs Exemption for Private Hospitals

Private hospitals are entitled to exemption from customs duty on imported equipment only if they provide free treatment to the poor held a Bench of the Supreme Court comprising Justices Harjit Singh Bedi and Tarun Chatterjee on May 16, 2008 in the case of M/s. Andromeda Foundation India P.Ltd. v. D.G.H.S. (Director General Health Services) & Ors..

On March 1, 1988, a Notification was issued by the Government of India whereby medical equipment imported for specified purposes was exempted from the payment of customs duty.

In this case, taking advantage of the Notification, a private hospital imported three machines. According to the exemption Notification the imported equipment was also to be used to provide free services to the poor. Since this did not appear to have been done, the Customs Duty Exemption Certificate was withdrawn and an attempt was made to recover customs duty from the hospital.

The matter ultimately reached the Supreme Court which found that Section 124 of the Customs Act which deals with the confiscation of goods had absolutely no applicability to the case.

The Court said that having imported medical equipment on concessional terms, it was incumbent on the hospital to have scrupulously observed the conditions of the import and to have followed the guidelines designed to ensure that the equipment was being properly utilized.

In Mediwell Hospital & Health Care’s case it was held that:

“The competent authority, therefore, should continue to be vigilant and check whether the undertakings given by the applicants are being being duly complied with after getting the benefit of the exemption notification and importing the equipment without payment of customs duty and if on such enquiry the authorities are satisfied that the continuing obligations are not being carried out then it would be fully open to the authority to ask the persons who have availed of the benefit of exemption to pay the duty payable in respect of the equipments which have been imported without payment of customs duty. “

Although this judgment has been overruled in a subsequent matter on a different point, the Bench said that the observations quoted above still hold the field.

The case of Jagdish Cancer & Research Centre was also referred to. In that case, the Supreme Court considered the implications of the non-compliance with the conditions of import and observed:

“It would, not at all, be necessary to prescribe any period to achieve the given percentage of patients treated free. It should generally be all through the period. It being at least 40 per cent, there is hardly any occasion to say that in case there is more than 40 per cent in a given period, that may make good the deficiency in the previous or the following year.”

Saying that it was also conscious of the large scale misuse of the medical equipment imported under the exemption notification, the Supreme Court said that it is essential that the authorities regulatory monitor the use of the equipment.

The Court did not rule in favour of the hospital in this case.

(This article is an edited extract of the judgment.)