Category Archives: Procedural Law

Rehauling Sexual Assault Law in India

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Comments on the Proposed Amendments to Criminal Law

The Criminal Law (Amendment) Bill, 2010 has been made available.  The Bill contains proposed amendments to two laws: the Indian Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code. The former is a substantive law while the latter is a procedural law. In other words, the Penal Code states what would constitute and offence and what the punishment for such offence would be. The Criminal Procedure Code, on the other hand, specifies the procedure required to be followed to implement the law laid down in the Penal Code.

The Bill, inter alia, redefines rape by proposing to amend Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code in the following terms:

A man is said to commit “sexual assault” if he –

(a) penetrates the vagina, the anus or urethra or mouth of any woman with

(i) any part of his body; or

(ii) any object manipulated by such man

except where such penetration is carried out for proper hygienic or medical purposes;

(b) manipulates any part of the body of woman so as to cause penetration into the vagina, the anus or the urethra of the offender by any part of the woman’s body;

(c) introduces any part of his penis into the mouth of woman,

under the circumstances falling under any of the following six descriptions:-

Firstly.-Against her will.

Secondly.- Without her consent

Thirdly.- With her consent when such consent has been obtained by putting her or any person in whom she is interested, in fear of death or of hurt.

Fourthly.- With her consent, when the man knows that he is not her husband and that her consent is given because she believes that he is another man to whom she is or believes to be lawfully married.

Fifthly.-With her consent when, at the time of giving such consent, by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication or the administration by him personally or through another of any stupefying or unwholesome substance, she is unable to understand the nature and consequences of that action to which she gives consent.

The exception for medical/hygienic purposes in Section375(a), however, doesn’t seem to require consent. What this would mean is that if the penetration were for medical purposes, and such purposes are not defined, the doctor, would not be required to obtain the consent of the woman so as to avoid falling foul of the provisions of this section if the proposed amendment were to become law. This, of course, could be considered to fly in the fact of the lived experiences of many women. It completely denies the existence of medical rape. It would also seem to exclude from the scope of sexual assault such things as medical students performing pelvic exams on unconscious women without their consent. While it is possible to see the requirement for such an exception, it is difficult to understand why the exception does not state: “except where such penetration is carried out for proper hygienic or medical purposes with the consent of the woman.”

After defining sexual assault, the proposed amendment then states the punishment for sexual assault and lists specific sexual assaults which would be dealt with in a stricter manner in Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code. Under Section 376(1), sexual assault would normally be punishable with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may be for life and, possibly, also a fine. Under Section 376(2), sexual assault by certain persons and/or under certain circumstances would be treated more seriously. Specifically:

Whoever,-

(a) being a police officer commits sexual assault -

(i) within the limits of the police station to which he is appointed; or

(ii) in the premises of any station house whether or not situated in the police station to which he is appointed; or

(iii) on a women in his custody or in the custody of a police officer subordinate to him; or

(b) being a public servant, takes advantage of his official position and commits sexual assault on a woman or minor in his custody as such public servant or in the custody of a public servant subordinate to him; or

(c) being on the management or on the staff of a jail, remand home or other place of custody established by or under any law for the time being in force or of a women’s or children’s institution takes advantage of his official position and commits sexual assault on any women or minor inmate of such jail, remand home, place or institution; or

(d) being on the management or on the staff of a hospital, takes advantage of his official position and commits sexual assault on a woman in that hospital; or

(e) being relative of, or person in a position of trust or authority towards, the women assaulted commits sexual assault with such woman; or

(f) commits sexual assault on a woman knowing her to be pregnant; or

(g) commits sexual assault on a woman when such woman is under eighteen years of age; or

(h) commits gang sexual assault,

(i) being in a position of economic or social or political dominance commits sexual assault on a woman under such dominance, or

(j) commits sexual assault on a woman suffering from mental and physical disability, or

(k) while committing sexual assault causes grievous bodily harm, maims or disfigures or endangers the life of a woman, or

(l) commits persistent sexual assault,

shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years but which may be imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine.

Thus, Section 376(2), if passed, would be an enhanced version of the current law as it introduces some new provisions such as that which deals with sexual assault by relatives.

Further, in the case of certain persons such as those who are in positions of authority or are public servants, sexual intercourse which does not amount to sexual assault would also be an offence under Section 376B of the Indian Penal Code in specified circumstances. If the perpetrator had taken advantage of his position and induced or seduced any woman either in his custody or under his charge or present in the premises and has sexual intercourse with her, the sexual intercourse would amount to sexual assault. The punishment for such an offence would be either simple or rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to 10 years but shall not be less than 5 years and, possibly, also a fine.

There has also been proposed an amendment to the Indian Penal Code (Section 376A) to deal with the sexual intercourse by a husband upon his wife during separation. Under this provision:

Whoever commits sexual assault with his own wife, who is living separately under a decree of separation or under any custom or usage without her consent shall be punished with imprisonment of either description, for a term which shall not be less than two years but which may be extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine.

Despite the hype about the proposed amendments regarding rape being gender-neutral, it is clear from Sections such as 376(2) that many of the provisions are gender-specific. For example, sexually assaulting a disabled woman would, at least theoretically, under Section 376(2)(j) result in an enhanced punishment but there would be no such enhancement of the punishment if the victim were male.

Also, the provision of Section 376(2)(g) which states that those who commit ”sexual assault on a woman when such woman is under eighteen years of age” is unclear. It has also been proposed to add a Section (dealt with later in this post) which deals with the sexual assault of minors with a minor being defined as a person who is under the age of 18. Section 376(2)(g) deals with the sexual assault of women in this same age group. It is not clear why it has been thought to be necessary to have two provisions which deal with the sexual assault of female minors, or which Section would actually apply in such a case.

One explanation would be that Section 376(2)(g) actually intends to deal with the age of consent. However, if this is the intention, it is not truly reflected by the wording of the law. Assuming that Section 376(2)(g) lays down the age of consent for women and states that it is 18 years of age, whether this age is too high is debatable. What appears to be a lacuna here, however, is that the age of the man is not taken into consideration at all. There should probably have been a proviso inserted into this clause which so that it would come into effect only if the other person involved was “x” number of years older than the complainant/victim. In other words, it is probably not ideal to have a law which states that if one person was 18, and the other 19, the consent of the 18 year old would be immaterial since, presumably, the reason for having an age of consent is to protect minors from adults, and not from other minors or from persons who are at the threshold of majority.

The provision which is proposed to be inserted into the Penal Code to deal with the sexual abuse of minors states:

(1) A person is said to commit “sexual abuse of minor” against a minor under the age of eighteen years if the person-

(i) penetrates his penis into the vagina, the anus or urethra or the mouth of a minor;

(ii) manipulates any object or part of his or her body or that of the minor so as to cause penetration into the vagina, the anus or urethra or mouth of any minor with or without the will or consent of the minor.

Explanation-Mere penetration is a sexual assault within the meaning of this section.

(2) Whoever commits any offence of sexual abuse of minor shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.

(3) Whoever, with sexual intent, invites, counsels or incites or exhibits pornography a minor to touch, directly or indirectly, with a part of the body or with an object, the body of any minor, including the body of the person who so invites, counsels or incites, or touches, with sexual intent, directly or indirectly, with a part of the body or with an object, any part of the body of a minor, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description which may extend to ten years.

(4) In this section,- (a) ‘minor’ means – a person under eighteen years of age.

There have been discussions about the need for such an amendment to the law for many years now. So far, it has only been possible to deal with child abuse under the existing Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code which deals with so-called unnatural offences. The Section has been notorious for its widespread misuse — consenting adult homosexuals have routinely reported being threatened with its implementation since the Section makes homosexual acts an offence even if they are between consenting adults.

As mentioned at the beginning of this piece, it has also been proposed to amend the Criminal Procedure Code so implement the changes in the Penal Code. Strangely enough, with respect to child sexual assault, the following amendment has been proposed:

198B. No court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) of section 376C of the Indian Penal Code, except upon a police report of facts which constitute such offence or upon a complaint made by the person aggrieved by the offence or by his father, mother, brother, sister or by his father’s or mother’s brother or sister or by any other person related to him by blood or adoption, if so permitted by the court.

This means that in cases of child sexual abuse, a complaint may only be filed by the victim or certain relatives of the victim. It does not seem realistic to expect a child to file, or even be able to file, a complaint. And, considering the way in which child sexual abuse, particularly when the abuser is a relative, is veiled in Indian society, it is extremely difficult to understand why relatives would be listed as the only possible complainants other than the victim. Under this provision, it appears that a complaint cannot be made by such persons as doctors and other health-care providers, caregivers or educators who may, in fact, be in a better position than relatives to make such a complaint.

Once a complaint has been made though, and the trial is in progress, it has been proposed to insert a provision into the Criminal Procedure Code which would allow the judge to take appropriate measures to ensure that the alleged minor victim of sexual assault or any other sexual offence is not confronted by the accused, although the court must also uphold the right of cross-examination of the accused.

Thus, although the aim seems to be to redefine and restructure sexual assault law in India, the proposed amendment, as it now stands, is not without its flaws.

By Nandita Saikia

 

Victims can get Bail Revoked

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Bail granted to those accused of perpetrating crimes can be cancelled.Section 437(5) of the CrPc says that any court which has released a person on bail (for a non-bailable offence) may, if it considers it necessary to do so, direct that such person be arrested and commit him to custody.Special powers are reposed in the High Court and Court of sessions under sec 439(2) whereby either court may direct that any person who has been released on bail be arrested and committed to custody.Usually, bail is cancelled because of the accused having misused bail.

In Public Prosecutor v. George Williams (1951 Mad 1042) the Madras High Court pointed out five grounds on which a bail could be cancelled:

(a)Where the person on bail, during the period of the bail, commits the very same offence for which is being tried or has been convicted, and thereby proves his utter unfitness to be on bail;

(b)If he hampers the investigation as will be the case if he, when on bail; forcibly prevents the search of place under his control for the corpus delicti or other incriminating things;

(c)If he tampers with the evidence, as by intimidating the prosecution witness, interfering with scene of the offence in order to remove traces or proofs of crime, etc.

(d)If he runs away to a foreign country, or goes underground, or beyond the control of his sureties; and

(e)If he commits acts of violence, in revenge, against the police and the prosecution witnessed & those who have booked him or are trying to book him

However, in what appears to be a landmark judgment, a bench of the Supreme Court comprising Justices Tarun Chatterjee and V S Sirpurkar have ruled that bail can be revoked if the accused is facing charges of having committed a crime such as murder and the victim of the crime raises valid objections to the grant of bail.

Observing that ‘the complainant can always question the merits of the order granting bail’, the Supreme Court came to this conclusion in the case of Brij Nandan Jaiswal v Munna @ Munna Jaiswal & Anr. The Bench categorically stated that ‘it is not as if once a bail as granted be any court, the only way to get it cancelled is on account of its misuse’.

 

 

 

 
 

 

 

Served on Facebook

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The law must change with changing times. And so, while the need to serve notices to people involved in litigation remains unchanged, the means with which it can be done has been wildly expanded.

 

Gone are the days when notices had to be served in person or by registered post. The Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court gave permission for a couple to be notified on Facebook that they had lost their home for defaulting on a loan repayment. It’s another matter that by the time, Mark McCormack, the lawyer who obtained the permission tried to do so, the couple’s Facebook Profiles had disappeared.

 

While this kind of issue hasn’t been raised in Indian courts yet, there are areas in the law where the ‘modernisation’ process has begun e.g. with regard to service of summons an amendment to the CPC in 2002 which was aimed at making litigation more speedy and effective, enabled use of information technology (fax, e-mail) and pre-approved private courier services for the purpose of issuing summons. Considering that most delays in procedure occur at the pre-trial stage, the need to modify the procedure on issuing summons was pressing.

 

It is clear that keeping step with the times is necessary for efficiency in the judicial process. Would Indian courts be willing to ‘scrap’ a summons anytime soon?

Interpleader Suits

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An interpleader suit is essentially a suit which is filed by a person who has no direct interest in the subject-matter of the suit. The classic classroom example is:

‘If you find a diamond ring which two people claim, you – the plaintiff – can file an interpleader suit to ask the Court to decide who among the claimant-defendants the owner of the ring is (and thus absolve yourself of responsibility).’

Such suits are governed by Order 35 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

In addition to all the usual requirements of a plaint, a plaint in an interpleader suit must state that the plaintiff claims no interest in the subject-matter of the suit other than for costs or charges. It must also state that there is no collusion between the plaintiff and any of the defendants.

If the thing being claimed is capable of either being paid into the court or being placed in the custody of the court, the plaintiff may be required to pay the amount or place it in the custody of the court to be entitled to an order in the suit.

It may so happen that the plaintiff in an interpleader suit is already being sued by a defendant in another proceeding for the subject-matter or the interpleader suit. In such a case, the court in which the plaintiff in the interpleader suit is being sued stays proceedings against the plaintiff and may provide for his costs. If it does not provide for his costs, the costs of the plaintiff in that suit may be added on to his costs in the interpleader suit.

The court hearing the interpleader suit may declare that the plaintiff’s liability to the defendants is discharged in respect of the subject-matter of the suit, award him his costs and dismiss him from the suit at the first hearing of the interpleader suit itself. However, the court may retain all the parties till the final disposal of the suit in the interest of justice or convenience.

Further, if the admissions of the parties or other evidence allow, the court may adjudicate the title of the subject-matter of the suit. If this is not possible, the question of title may be framed as an issue and tried as it would be tried in an ordinary suit either with or without making one of the defendant-claimants a plaintiff whether instead of or in addition to the original plaintiff in the interpleader suit.

Interpleader suits cannot be filed by tenants or by agents so as to make their landlords or principals interplead with persons who have not claimed through such landlords or principals.

Dying Declarations

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Dying declarations which are most often seen in cases of dowry death and murder are dealt with in Section 32 (1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1972. Under this sub-section, the statement of a person who is dead is relevant at a trial if it speaks of the cause of death of that person. Such a statement may even speak of the circumstances in which the person died.

Such a statement is a relevant fact whether or not the person who made it expected to die at the time when he made it.

The provision is applicable to both civil and criminal trials. This is not the case in English law: the corresponding law in England is applicable only to criminal cases.

The statutory provisions which deal with dying declarations do not say anything further. However, over time, there has been built up a large body of case law which deals with exactly how dying declarations are to be treated by courts, how much ‘weight’ should be accorded to them and what should be done if there is more than dying declaration and those declarations conflict with each other.

A dying declaration may be oral. This is, as Justice Thakker put it in the case of Vikas and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, 2008, “an exception to the general rule reflected in Section 60 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 which enacts that oral evidence in all cases must be direct, viz., if it refers to a fact which could be seen, it must be the evidence of a witness who says he saw it; if it refers to a fact which could be heard, it must be the evidence of a witness who says he heard it; if it refers to a fact which could be perceived by any other sense or in any other manner, it must be the evidence of a witness who says he perceived it by that sense or in that manner.”

In the judgment of this case, which was decided by a Bench of the Supreme Court comprising Justices C K Thakker and M Katju, dying declarations were discussed in detail. The judgement, inter alia, said:

The principle underlying admissibility of dying declaration is reflected in the well-known legal maxim: Nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire. A dying man is face to face with his Maker without any motive for telling a lie.

‘Truth,’ said Mathew Arnold, ‘sits upon the lips of a dying man.’

Shakespeare, great writer of the sixteenth century, through one of his characters explained the basic philosophy thus;

‘Have I met hideous death within my view,
Retaining but a quantity of life,
Which bleeds away,
Even as a form of wax,
Resolveth from his figure,
Against the Fire?
What is the world should
Make me now deceive,
Since I must lose the use of all deceit?
Why should I then be false,
Since it is true
That I must die here,
Live hence by truths?’
(King John, Act V, Sect. IV)

The Great poet also said at another place:

‘Where words are scarce,
They are seldom spent in vain;
They breathe the truth,
That breathe their words in pain.’
(Richard II)

Section 32 (1) of the Act has been enacted by the Legislature advisedly as a matter of necessity as an exception to the general rule that hearsay evidence is no evidence and the evidence which cannot be tested by cross-examination of a witness is not admissible in a Court of Law. But the purpose of cross-examination is to test the veracity of the statement made by a witness. The requirement of administering oath and cross-examination of a maker of a statement can be dispensed with considering the situation in which such statement is made, namely, at a time when the person making the statement is almost dying.

A man on the death-bed will not tell lies. Moreover, if the dying declaration is excluded from admissibility of evidence, it may result in miscarriage of justice inasmuch as in a given case, the victim may be the only eye-witness of a serious crime. Exclusion of his statement will leave the Court with no evidence whatsoever and a culprit may go unpunished causing miscarriage of justice.

The question as to admissibility of dying declaration has come up for consideration before Indian as well as foreign courts. In R.V. Woodcock, (1789) 1 Leach 500 : 168 ER 352, Eyre, C.V. proclaimed, ‘The general principle on which this species of evidence is admitted is that they are declarations made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death, and when every hope of this world is gone, when every motive to falsehood is silenced and the mind induced by the most powerful consideration to speak the truth; situation so solemn and so awful is considered by the law as creating an obligation equal to that which is imposed by a positive oath administered in a Court of Justice.’

In India, Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay, 1958 SCR 552 was probably the first leading case decided by the Supreme Court on admissibility of dying declarations and, in its judgment, the Court inter alia said that where a dying declaration is recorded by a competent Magistrate, it would stand on a much higher footing.

Considering the views expressed by different High Courts and also leading commentaries, the Supreme Court summarized the principles thus:

  1. that it cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that a dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated;
  2. that each case must be determined on its own facts keeping in view the circumstances in which the dying declaration was made;
  3. that it cannot be laid down as a general proposition that a dying declaration is a weaker kind of evidence than other piece of evidence;
  4. that a dying declaration stands on the same footing as another piece of evidence and has to be judged in the light of surrounding circumstances and with reference to the principles governing the weighing of evidence;
  5. that a dying declaration which has been recorded by a competent magistrate in the proper manner, that is to say, in the form of questions and answers, and, as far as practicable, in the words of the maker of the declaration, stands on a much higher footing than a dying declaration which depends upon oral testimony which may suffer from all the infirmities of human memory and human character, and
  6. that in order to test the reliability of a dying declaration, the Court has to keep in view the circumstances like the opportunity of the dying man for observation, for example, whether there was sufficient light if the crime was committed at night; whether the capacity of the man to remember the facts stated had not been impaired at the time he was making the statement, by circumstances beyond his control; that the statement has been consistent throughout if he had several opportunities of making a dying declaration apart from the official record of it; and that the statement had been made at the earliest opportunity and was not the result of tutoring by interested parties.

In Smt. Paniben v. State of Gujarat, (1992) 2 SCC 474, the Supreme Court, referring to earlier case law, summed up principles governing dying declarations as under:

  1. There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration.
  2. If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without corroboration.
  3. This Court has to scrutinise the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased had opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration.
  4. Where dying declaration is suspicious it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence.
  5. Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying declaration the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected.
  6. A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction.
  7. Merely because a dying declaration does not contain the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected.
  8. Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth.
  9. Normally the court in Order to satisfy whether deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration look up to the medical opinion. But where the eye witness has said that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make this dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail.
  10. Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon.

Recently, in the case of Amol Singh v. State of MP, 2008, a Bench of the Supreme Court held that ‘it is not the plurality of the dying declarations but the reliability thereof that adds weight to the prosecution case. If a dying declaration is found to be voluntary, reliable and made in fit mental condition, it can be relied upon without any corroboration. The statement should be consistent throughout If the deceased had several opportunities of making such dying declarations, that is to say, if there are more than one dying declaration they should be consistent. (See: Kundula Bala Subrahmanyam v. State of A.P. [ (1993) 2 SCC 684]. However, if some inconsistencies are noticed between one dying declaration and the other, the court has to examine the nature of the inconsistencies, namely, whether they arematerial or not. While scruitinizing the contents of various dying declaration, in such a situation, the court has to examine the same in the light of the various surrounding facts and circumstances’.

Dying Declarations and other Similar Statements

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Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1972 deals with dying declarations and other similar statements such as those made by persons who cannot be found.

Statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who is dead, or who cannot be found, or who has become incapable of giving evidence, or whose attendance cannot be procured without an amount of delay or expense which, under the circumstances of the case, appears to the Court unreasonable, are themselves relevant facts in the following cases:

(1) When it relates to the cause of death

(2) Or is made in the course of business

(3) Or against the interest of maker

(4) Or gives an opinion as to a public right or custom, or matters of general interest

(5) Or relates to the existence of relationship

(6) Or is made in a will or deed relating to family affairs

(7) Or in a document relating to transaction mentioned in Section 13 (a)

(8) Or is made by several persons and expresses feelings relevant to matter in question

The basic scheme of the Section has been considered in the table below:

Section Question before the Court Circumstances in which the statement was made Whose Other conditions
32 (1) The cause of the death of the person making the statement and the circumstances in which he died The statement is relevant whether or not the person making it is under the expectation of death The person who has died Applicable in both civil and criminal cases (In English law: only in criminal cases)
32 (2)   - an entry or memorandum made in course of business, or in the discharge of professional duty- an acknowledgement of the receipt of money, goods, securities or property- a document used in commerce written or signed by him- the date of a letter or other document usually dated, written or signed by him    
32 (3)   Against the pecuniary or proprietary interest of the maker which would expose him or would have exposed him to a criminal prosecution / suit for damages    
32 (4) The existence of a public right/ custom, or matter of public/ general interest   Person likely to be aware of its existence Statement made before any controversy as to such right, custom or matter arose
32 (5) The existence of any relationship by blood, marriage or, adoption   Person who had knowledge of its existence Statement made before the question in dispute arose
32 (6) The existence of any relationship by blood, marriage or, adoption Made in any will or deed relating to the family’s affairs to which any such deceased person belonged, or in any family pedigree, or upon any tombstone, family portrait or other thing on which such statements are usually made   Statement made before the question in dispute arose
32 (7) The existence of any right/custom created/claimed/ recognised/ asserted/ denied by any transaction Made in any deed, document or will    
32 (8)   Made by a number of persons who expressed impressions on their part    

Read more: Dying Declarations

The Admissibility of Searches for Narcotic Drugs

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A trial court convicted one Udai Lal of transporting (maize and) opium and sentenced him to ten years in jail. It also fined him one lakh INR. The Rajasthan High Court acquitted him and the State filed an appeal against this decision in the Supreme Court.

A Bench of the Supreme Court comprising Justices Arijit Pasayat and P. Sathasivam said that the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act is a special Act and the High Courts should exercise their powers cautiously keeping in mind that the Act aims to prevent smuggling.

The Court said:

“The law on the point is very clear that even if there is any sort of procedural illegality in conducting search and seizure, the evidence collected thereby will not become inadmissible and the court would consider all the circumstances and find out whether any serious prejudice had been caused to the accused.”

“If the search and seizure was in complete defiance of the law and procedure and there was any possibility of the evidence collected likely to have been tampered with or interpolated during the course of such search or seizure, then, it could be said that the evidence is not liable to be admissible in evidence.”

“In order to consolidate and amend the law relating to narcotic drugs, to make stringent provisions for the control and regulation of operations relating to narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, to provide for the forfeiture of property derived from, or used in, illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, to implement the provisions of the International Convention on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Parliament enacted NDPS Act in the year 1985.”

The Supreme Court said that it was satisfied that the High Court failed to consider all the relevant materials and circumstances and remitted the case to the High Court for fresh disposal in six months’ time.

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