The general rule is that welfare statutes are to be construed as liberally as possible but whether or not a statute is a welfare statute, it cannot be given an interpretation which is simply not consistent with its provisions.
On May 13, 2008, a Bench of the Supreme Court comprising Justices S B Sinha and L S Panta refused to stay an eviction from rented business premises by a landlord who wanted the premises for his own business in the case of Ganga Devi v. Distt. Judge, Nainital & Ors..
The tenant was a 76-year-old widow named Ganga Devi who prayed for the eviction to be stayed because of her being a 76-year-old widow. Her husband, Khyali Ram, had earlier been a tenant in the premises. After his death, she took over the business.
The landlord applied for the release of the shop before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nainital under Section 21 (1)(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. His application was dismissed by the Prescribed Authority but the Appellate Authority reversed the order. The writ petition filed by Ganga Devi thereagainst was dismissed by the High Court.
Section 41 of the Act provides for the rule making power. Rule 16(2) of the State of U.P. known as U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rentand Eviction) Rules, says:
16. Application for release on the ground of personal requirement:
(1)………………………
(2) While considering an application for release under Section 21 (1)(a)in respect of a building let out for purposes of any business, the Prescribed Authority shall also have regard to such facts as the following:
(a) the greater the period since when the tenant opposite party, or the original tenant whose heir the opposite party is, has been carrying on his business in that building, the less the justification for allowing the application;
(b) Where the tenant has available with him suitable accommodation to which he can shift his business without substantial loss there shall be greater justification for allowing the application.
(c) the greater the existing business of the landlord’s own, apart from the business proposed to be set up in the leased premises, the less the justification for allowing the application, and even if an application is allowed in such a case, the prescribed authority may on the application of the tenant impose the condition where the landlord has available with him other accommodation (whether subject to the Act or not) which is not suitable for his own proposed business but may serve the purpose of the tenant, that the landlord shall let out that accommodation to the tenant on a fair rent to be fixed by the prescribed authority;
(d) where a son or unmarried or widowed or divorced or judicially separated daughter of a male lineal descendant of the landlord has, after the building was originally let out, completed his or her technical education and is not employed in Government service, and wants to engage in self employment, his or her need shall be given due consideration.
When the matter reached the Supreme Court, the Court said:
Comparative hardship, indisputably, is a relevant factor for determining the question as to whether the requirement of the landlord is bona fide or not within the meaning of the provisions of the said Act and the Rules. It is essentially a question of fact. Such a question of fact, however, is to be determined on the touchstone of the statutory provisions as contained in Section 21(1)(a) and Rules 16(2)(c) of the Rules.
Rule 16 provides for some factors which are required to be taken into consideration for the purpose of determining the comparative hardship.
The provisions of the statutory rules must be interpreted so as to give effect to the object and purport of the Act. It cannot be applied in a vacuum, as the statute requires comparison of the hardship of both the tenant as also the landlord. It is, therefore, not a case where Rule 16 has any application.
The court would not determine a question only on the basis of sympathy or sentiment. Stricto sensu equity as such may not have any role to play.
(This post is an edited extract of the judgment.)