The basic premise of the interpretation of statutes is that sentia legis should be given effect to. One of the ways in which it is ensured that this is done is by placing great value on the interpretations of the draftsperson of the legislation and of the executive upon its coming into force. Their interpretations can, as a general rule, be considered to be contemporaneous expositions of the law.

A Bench of the Supreme Court comprising Justices S.B. Sinha & V.S. Sirpurkar discussed the rule of executive construction in the case of R & B Falcon (A) Pty Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, 2008. it said that ‘where a representation is made by the maker of legislation at the time of introduction of the Bill or construction thereupon is put by the executive upon its coming into force, the same carries a great weight’. It went on to say:

“The reason for giving effect to such executive construction is not only same as contemporaneous which would come within the purview of the maxim temporania caste pesto, even in certain situation a representation made by an authority like Minister presenting the Bill before the Parliament may also be found bound thereby.

The House of Lords in the matter of R.V. National Asylum Support Service [(2002) 1 W.L.R.2956] spoke of ‘executive estoppel’. Lord Steyn said, “If exceptionally there is found in the Explanatory Notes a clear assurance by the executive to Parliament about the meaning of a clause, or the circumstances in which a power will or will not be used, that assurance may in principle be admitted against the executive in proceedings in which the executive places a contrary contention before a court.”

A similar interpretation was rendered by Lord Hope of Craighead in Wilson v. First County Trust Ltd., [2004] 1 A.C. 816, wherein it was stated:

“As I understand it [Pepper v. Hart, 1993], it recognized a limited exception to the general rule that resort to ‘Hansard’ was inadmissible. Its purpose is to prevent the Executive seeking to place a meaning on words used in legislation which is different from that which ministers attributed to whose words when promoting the legislation in Parliament.”

In the case of Sedco Forex International Drill. Inc. & Ors. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Dehradun & Anr. [(2005) 12 SCC 717], the question which arose before the Supreme Court was as to the salary paid to the employees of UK National Services for field breaks outside India would be subjected to tax under Section 9(1)(ii) and explanation appended thereto as inserted in 1983 w.e.f 1.4.1979. Appellant therein entered into agreements which are executed in the United Kingdom with each of the said employees who were residents of the said country. The Supreme Court, upon noticing the explanation appended to Section 9(1)(ii), as regards its retrospective operation, held:

“16. The departmental understanding of the effect of the 1999 Amendment even if it were assumed not to bind the respondents under Section 119 of the Act, nevertheless affords a reasonable construction of it, and there is no reason why we should not adopt it.”

Thus, where there exists a legal exposition of the law by legislators or the executive, the Court will not only follow that exposition itself but also prevent the executive from later refusing to follow it.

Link: R & B Falcon Pty Ltd. v. CIT, 2008