The Burden of Proof in Dowry Deaths
In a dowry death case, the husband was acquitted because he was not present in the village at the time of his wife’s death. His parents were, however, convicted. The Rajasthan High Court set aside their conviction since the State did not appeal against the husband’s acquittal. The Supreme Court has held that the State’s failure to appeal against the husband’s acquittal does automatically mean that the prosecution failed to prove charges of dowry death under the Indian Penal Code.
The case contains a detailed discussion of where the burden of proof lies in cases of dowry deaths:
“In our considered view, this was a fit case for invoking Section 106 of the Evidence Act, which lays down that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of the any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. In Ram Gulam Chaudhary vs. State of Bihar [2001 (8) SCC 311] this Court considered the applicability of Section 106 of the Evidence Act in a case somewhat similar to the present one. Even though Section 106 of the Evidence Act may not be intended to relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, but the section would apply to cases like the present, where the prosecution has succeeded in proving facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding death. The accused by virtue of their special knowledge must offer an explanation which might lead the court to draw a different inference.
In Trimukh Maroti Kirkan vs. State of Maharashtra [2006 (1) SCC 681], a two judge-bench of which one of us (G.P.Mathur,J.) was a member, considered the applicability of Section 106 of the Evidence Act and observed:
“The demand for dowry or money from the parents of the bride has shown a phenomenal increase in the last few years. Cases are frequently coming before the courts, where the husband or in-laws have gone to the extent of killing the bride if the demand is not met. These crimes are generally committed in complete secrecy inside the house and it becomes very difficult for the prosecution to lead evidence. No member of the family, even if he is a witness of the crime, would come forward to depose against another family member. The neighbours, whose evidence may be of some assistance, are generally reluctant to depose in court as they want to keep aloof and do not want to antagonise a neighbourhood family. The parents or other family members of the bride being away from the scene of commission of crime are not in a position to give direct evidence which may inculpate the real accused except regarding the demand of money or dowry and harassment caused to the bride. But, it does not mean that a crime committed in secrecy or inside the houses should go unpunished.”
If an offence takes place inside the privacy of a house and in such circumstances where the assailants have all the opportunity to plan and commit the offence at the time and in circumstances of their choice, it will be extremely difficult for the prosecution to lead evidence to establish the guilt of the accused if the strict principle of circumstantial evidence, as noticed above, is insisted upon by the courts. A judge does not preside over a criminal trial merely to see that no innocent man is punished. A judge also presides to see that a guilty man does not escape. Both are public duties. (See Stirland v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1944 AC 315] quoted with approval by Arijit Pasayat, J. in State of Punjab v. Karnail Singh [2003 (11) SCC 271]. The law does not enjoin a duty on the prosecution to lead evidence of such character which is almost impossible to be led or at any rate extremely difficult to be led. The duty on the prosecution is to lead such evidence which it is capable of leading, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case.
Where an offence like murder is committed in secrecy inside a house, the initial burden to establish the case would undoubtedly be upon the prosecution, but the nature and amount of evidence to be led by it to establish the charge cannot be of the same degree as is required in other cases of circumstantial evidence. The burden would be of a comparatively lighter character. In view of Section 106 of the Evidence Act there will be a corresponding burden on the inmates of the house to give a cogent explanation as to how the crime was committed. The inmates of the house cannot get away by simply keeping quiet and offering no explanation on the supposed premise that the burden to establish its case lies entirely upon the prosecution and there is no duty at all on an accused to offer any explanation.
Similar view has been expressed in State of Punjab vs. Karnail Singh [2003 (11) SCC 271], State of Rajasthan vs. Kashi Ram [2006 (12) SCC 254], Raj Kumar Prasad Tamakar vs. State of Bihar [2007 (1) SCR 13].
We are sure, if the learned Single Judge of the High Court had adverted to Section 106 of the Evidence Act and correctly applied the principles of law, he would not have committed the grave error of acquitting the respondent.”
CASE NO.: Appeal (crl.) 1133 of 2000
State of Rajasthan v. Jaggu Ram
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/01/2008
BENCH: G.P. Mathur & G.S. Singhvi
JUDGMENT: G.S. Singhvi, J.
